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REGIONAL

Prince Turki Discusses Saudi Role in Sudanese Crisis

44040268 Khartoum AL-ASHIQA' in Arabic
31 May 88 pp 17-22

[Interview with Saudi Prince Turki ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, by Muhammad Mahfuz and al-Baqi Ahmad 'Abdallah, Jeddah, date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Your Highness, relations between Saudi Arabia and the Sudan are marked by a special historical status that expressed itself when [King Fahd], Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, hastened to support the new regime in the Sudan in the first hours of its life.

To what extent can these relations between the two fraternal countries be further developed?

[Answer] Without a doubt, what links us and our brothers in the Sudan is something that cannot be expressed in a few words in this brief newspaper interview. It is stronger and more enduring than all words. From the days of the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to the days of the late, great King Faysal—may God's mercy be upon him—and into the days of King Fahd bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, our relations with our kin in the Sudan have constantly been marked by a special character of mutual love and trust. Thus it was natural for the Custodian of the Two Mosques to hasten to support his kin in the Sudan and stand beside them while they were confronting those well-known circumstances.

As for the dimensions for further development of these relations to the benefit of our two countries, we believe the process is proceeding in a way that will in the end realize the ambitious projects we hope for and that will achieve abundance and prosperity for all.

[Question] Your Highness, the problem of the Sudanese South, which for more than 30 years has constituted a continual drain on the economy and energies of the Sudan's people, has recently come to threaten the Sudan's unity and territorial integrity and even threatens the security of the entire Arab and African region.

How does Your Highness think this problem, with its dangerous effects on the African continent and the south of the Arabian peninsula, including the problem of Eritrea which in reality parallels the problem of the Sudanese South, should be confronted in the future?

[Answer] The ongoing conflict in the Sudanese South cannot be understood apart from the historical realities experienced by the entire region. One sees how British imperialism, which was an immediate cause of the Palestinian problem through its ill-fated Balfour Promise, left its clear mark on virtually all Arab lands. When

British imperialism was forced to leave because of the ceaseless struggle of the peoples of these lands, it left behind these violent conflicts between members of a single people. The purpose was to block the development and progress of those countries.

I therefore believe it has been fully established, from the time when the first rebellion in the South of the Sudan flared up in September 1955, just before the official proclamation of that fraternal country's independence, until the time of the recent rebellion movement led by John Garang that has caused so much suffering to the Sudan, that this chronic problem that was created by imperialism can be solved only by the Sudanese themselves through open dialogue based on mutual trust, knowledge, and understanding within a united Sudan.

Without doubt, it has become clear that this problem has a negative impact on the entire region, including the Nile Valley and the African continent, due to the Sudan's important strategic position. It is strange that voices are being raised calling for possibly solving the problem of the Sudanese South at the expense of the Eritrean cause. I fully trust that the Sudanese have continually rejected such bartering at the expense of their Eritrean brothers.

[Question] Perhaps Your Highness has noticed that the conflict in the Arab and African region has begun to take on a sectarian and racial character with the support of certain international organizations that have taken it upon themselves to shake established beliefs and kindle the fire of religious and racial unrest.

As the most prominent of the Islamic countries active in spreading Islam and at the same time calling for unity of Arab and Islamic ranks, what is Saudi Arabia's role in throwing a cordon around this conflict?

[Answer] Anyone who gives close consideration to the political map of our region notices that the racial and cultural conflict you have mentioned has begun to surface in a disturbing manner. The recent failed coup attempt in Mauritania can perhaps be considered the best proof of what we are saying. You notice that the beginning of the plot took place by means of organized migrations from Senegal and Mali into Mauritania some time before the coup. The aim was to create a state of disequilibrium. The awareness of the national leadership in that fraternal country helped frustrate the racist plot. The Ethiopian regime's attempt to dissolve the Eritrean identity, the conflict that continues to grind at western Somalia, and ongoing events in the Sudan confirm what you said about a sectarian and racial conflict behind which stand a number of international organizations known for their hostility to Islam and Muslims.

Given the responsibilities that Saudi Arabia's position in the Islamic world dictates, there is no doubt that the Saudi kingdom finds itself on the confrontation line against these plots that aim at sowing a state of anarchy and instability in the region. Saudi Arabia will exert

every effort to throw a cordon around such irresponsible operations. It will do so by working for unity of the Islamic and Arab ranks in order to achieve peace and security in the Arab and African region.

[Question] Your Highness, the Sudanese people are facing a complete economic collapse which they have not yet been able to transcend. There is almost a belief that the Arab and Islamic countries have not responded as required, given the real trial to which the Sudan has been subjected.

How does Your Highness see the possibility of dealing with this deficiency in light of the Arab solidarity for which Saudia Arabia stands as one of the pillars?

[Answer] Without a doubt, the Sudan, with its extensive fertile lands, can be considered the bread basket for the entire Arab world. Therefore, all that is required from this point of view is that Arab capital and expertise be offered for using these good lands and investing in them so as to realize the expected return for our Arab and Islamic nation. Whatever the case may be, the Sudan is currently suffering from a severe economic crisis as a result of circumstances for which all the Sudanese are paying the price. I think the matter can be resolved when the appropriate climate is present, given real stability that guarantees freedom of movement, and given clear investment policies that stimulate the Arab investor, who would thus contribute to the development and support of his brothers there, in addition to realizing a sufficient return.

[Box, p 19]

—Heroic Palestinian fighters in the occupied land have demonstrated outstanding courage and boldness in unparalleled historical battles against projects for criminal Zionist expansion.

—The return of Egypt with its well-known historical weight has planted confidence and hope in the heart of every Arab.

[Box, p 21]

—Iraq's regaining of al-Faw is a victory for all the Arabs. We should rejoice and be proud of it.

—The drug problem is one of the most dangerous problems confronting the world today because of its effect on the future of entire societies.

—Saudi women have obtained sufficient attention, education, and professional activity, in addition to their knowledge of the fundamentals of their religion and creed.

12937

Problems of Petrochemical Sector Outlined

44040256C Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic
28 May 88 p 5

[Text] A field study of the petrochemical industry in the GCC nations, conducted by a Saudi academic team from the research and development center in the King 'Abdul-'Aziz University, showed that one of the most important current requirements for the success of the petrochemical industry is to increase efforts expended in the area of coordination among Gulf nations, particularly since 90 percent of the products of this industry are exported. Foreign [products] only account for 8 percent of total world production.

At the initial stage, the study dealt with domestic and external difficulties to which the petrochemical industry may be exposed. It then divided these items into four categories.

Technical Difficulties

These are represented by problems in comprehending the special technology of the petrochemical sector, following up the technical developments that will take place in this industry in the future, and the degree of ability to adapt to these developments. Likewise, there are special difficulties, maintenance and production of spare parts necessary for industry. These difficulties are in the light of the difficulties facing these attempts at the present time.

Marketing Difficulties

These problems basically stem from heavy competition that prevails in the international markets. Problems include marketing of petrochemical products, which fluctuates according to levels of international activity and the influence of political relations on international markets.

The study also recommended the construction of factories to produce and fabricate spare parts necessary for the maintenance and continuity of petrochemical industries as well as small local industries.

The study emphasized the importance of establishing effective and wide distribution channels to market petrochemical products in local and international markets.

The study also explained that the average local consumption rate is 10 percent of total production, which is to gradually increase in Saudi Arabia as the needs for such industries increase in the future.

The study called for specialized research based on field information about local demand for petrochemical products, the volume of imported petrochemical products, and the industries that must be founded which are complementary and supportive to the petrochemical industry. This should be done for the sake of precisely

ascertaining in the future, local demand for petrochemical products. As local capacity of the GCC nations is 10 percent, the share of the international markets would be 90 percent of the total Gulf production of petrochemicals. This represents about 8 percent of current world production. Such a percentage would inevitably face great marketing competition.

Because of the above, there must be a marketing plan that includes a clarification of the role of marketing elements in executing the plan, such as prices, distribution outlets, and storage.

The study emphasized that dependence on the price element would not realize the goal of the region's nations of entering into international markets, as both choices of price reduction or increase would result in resentment among others in this industry.

At this point, the study recommended resorting to other elements, such as quality, developed technology, facilitating payments. All these elements could provide several advantages for the opportunities to market Gulf petrochemical products. The study called on responsible parties to seriously think of establishing a naval fleet to transport petrochemical products.

Manpower Difficulties

These are considered one of the most important challenges facing the national industry in the Arabian Gulf region, particularly for an industry the size of the petrochemical industry which Saudi Arabia founded. Thus, there is a clear shortage of technical and administrative skills, resulting in a heavy dependence on foreign labor and facing the many problems that accompany this phenomenon, among which is the high rate of turnover.

Social Difficulties

Under these problems comes the social consequences resulting from the need for a new industrial atmosphere in the kingdom, and the extent of anticipated response of youths to work in this industry.

Suggestions and Recommendations

After the study diagnosed various difficulties which the Saudi and Gulf petrochemical industries are expected to face, it offered several suggestions and recommendations that would help overcome such problems. The first suggestion was to increase the efforts expended in the realm of coordination among Gulf nations in the field of petrochemical industry, provided this would take place in light of the resources available to each nation.

It is important for Arab markets to expand their use of petrochemical industries along with growth of their economies. It is also important that aspects of these markets be regulated and that all this be supervised by an

agreed upon unified authority, in order to enable it to introduce the necessary developments side by side with the latest world marketing and production developments.

In facing the difficulties related to human resources, the study recommended the establishment of technical institutes which would strive to train specialized staff in petrochemical industries.

9455

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Leader Advocates Reassessment of Israel

44040251a Damascus AL-HADAF in Arabic
15 May 88 pp 6-23

[Article by George Habash: "Toward a Deeper, More Accurate Understanding of the Zionist Entity: Toward a Comprehensive Palestinian-Arab-International Confrontation Strategy"]

[Text] In this comprehensive study Dr George Habash, secretary general of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, sheds further light on the studies and errors which have accompanied the course of the Palestinian and Arab struggle of national liberation against the Zionist entity, proposing a new strategy which will alleviate the burdens of the historic task assigned to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab liberation movement, thereby proceeding from a deeper, more accurate view of the transformations which have occurred in the structure of the Zionist entity during the past 4 decades in the context of the economy, politics, society and strategy.

Forty years have elapsed since the establishment of the Zionist entity on the territory of Palestine. Forty years are the life of the Palestinian and Arab disaster. The Palestinian diaspora is the life of uprooting, wandering, effacement, dispersion, killing and collective massacres to which our people have been exposed at the hands of the Zionist gangs and the forces conspiring with them.

Forty years, full of the resistance, confrontation and intractable struggle which the people of Palestine and the peoples of our Arab nation have engaged in for the sake of preserving their identity and personality and for the sake of winning their rights and regaining their usurped nation.

In 1948, the Zionist gangs achieved what they sought and Hertzl's ideas, included in his book "The Nation of the Jews," were indeed turned into a nation for the Jews on the territory of Palestine. It became possible for these gangs, armed with the maximum degrees of imperialist support in general and British support in particular, to establish their country "under the umbrella of international legitimacy" which the partition resolution, 181, embodied: indeed, it became possible for these gangs to

go far in "giving concrete form" to this resolution in a manner which eliminated the boundaries of the Palestinian nation as this resolution had drawn them up.

It was only a few months until the conspiracy was completed, in part, by the agreement of the "Jericho conference," the Hashemite regime's declaration of the annexation of the remaining portion of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thus for many years after that the word "Palestine" disappeared from the lexicon of politics and geography in a vicious attempt to eliminate it from the Palestinian memory.

While it is appropriate to consider 15 May an official date for the establishment of the enemy's nation, the actual date of the emergence of this nation goes back much further than that. The establishment of this entity came as an extension of a comprehensive stage of construction which lasted 30 years, from the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to the partition resolution, when the Jewish agency played the role of a state within a state and exercised these powers in the broadest political, economic, military and social framework.

This stage, the stage of British imperialism's official, declared embrace of the Zionist plan, was an extension of 20 years of preparatory efforts which assumed their organized, comprehensive form in the Basel conference in Switzerland in 1898—which, in its turn, came about as a completion and culmination of a movement of controversy and dialogue which accompanied the emergence of Zionism in the middle of the last century.

Perhaps here precisely lies the reason for the "Israeli surprise" in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Those who considered that this war would be a "brief promenade" thought that they were facing a "few people with perverse perspectives," and were not sufficiently aware of the development of "Israeli power" in various human, economic, arms procurement and military areas, which perceptibly exceeded the "Arab power" which entered the war—not just on the level of quality, of arms procurement, but also on the quantitative-human level as well.

That occurred in conjunction with an understanding of the impotence and treason of Arab reaction and the rampant spread of the manifestations of backwardness and fragmentation in Arab conditions. The war of 1948 was between two groups, first the Israeli group, which was living in its present and building its future on various levels and in various contexts, and second the Arab group, which had emerged from the womb of the heavy Ottoman legacy and whose actual development had been confined in the limits of 1918, thanks to imperialist dominance, the division of influence and the breakdown of the region among the basic imperialist centers of that time.

For all this, the 1948 defeat constituted a classic concurrence of Zionist designs, colonial collusion and the impotence and treason of Arab reaction. Building on that, it was obvious that the appeal to regain Palestine should come together with the appeal to get rid of the corrupt Arab reactionary regimes and the appeal for liberation from colonialism.

The disruption in the balance of power which existed on the international stage at that time helped make the imperialist-Zionist effort of establishing Israel succeed. The Soviet Union, emerging from the war exhausted with its wounds, and the young socialist system along with it, were not in a position to enable it to thwart this scheme. Above and beyond that there were the erroneous assessments and conceptions on which many positions vis-a-vis the Zionist entity were founded—both those connected to what is called "the right of self-determination for the Jews" and those related to opportunities and probabilities of "the democratic development of the young Hebrew nation."

Many circles in world public opinion imagined that Israel, the country of the Jews, victims who had paid a relatively higher price than others for the barbarous Nazi upsurge in Europe, would be the "meek lamb," the oasis of democracy, in the region. The Western and Zionist media machine helped in the publicization and promotion of this image, realizing tangible successes from whose clutches world public opinion could not totally be liberated even after 40 years had elapsed since the establishment of the Zionist entity, in spite of the serious perceptible shift in the image and status of Israel on the international stage as it assumed the image of the "rapacious wolf" firing on children, women and old men and committing collective massacres which gradually replaced the image of the "meek lamb" permanently threatened by "Arab barbarism" and "Palestinian terrorism."

Today, 4 decades have elapsed since the establishment of this entity. More than half of this time has been in the context of the presence of the modern armed Palestinian revolution. During this period, six wars have occurred (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978 and 1982), not to mention unrelenting skirmishes and limited military actions throughout this period. The overall result of these 4 decades of struggle has in general been in the enemy's favor.

The Zionist movement during these years has managed to achieve a group of strategic goals, of which the most important have been:

A. The declaration of the establishment of the nation on an area more expansive than the boundaries of the partition resolution resulting from the 1948 war.

B. The expansion of this country's boundaries over an area greater than all the boundaries of Palestine, through its annexation of part of Syria and Egypt as a result of the June 1967 war and the extension of its direct military influence into the interior of Lebanon as a result of the 1978 and 1982 wars.

C. The implantation of the country's internal foundation in the socioeconomic contexts and in the military context in the framework of a comprehensive strategic plan.

D. The increase in its acceptance through the concurrence of interests or the effect of the fait accompli, especially in the past 10 years which have followed the signing of the Camp David agreements.

E. Its possession of the initiative within a balance of power which was clearly tilted in its favor.

The net result of what the enemy's nation achieved in the past 40 years converted Israel from the dimensions of a "place of refuge" or "national home" to the ranks of "the regional major country" which today stands out not just through its character as the greatest threat to the future of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples but whose threats, and the limits of the vital area of whose power, extend to the regional and international contexts.

For numerous considerations, the success the enemy has achieved is in reality much greater than what is apparent, for two basic considerations. The first is that the Palestinian Arab group's movement is in keeping with history while the course of the Zionist plan is the opposite of that. The second consideration is related to the magnitude of the resources which it is supposed are in the possession of the Arab group; in various contexts they are immeasurably greater than the resources available to the enemy.

Nonetheless, the outcome of the struggle has been in favor of the party that was weaker in terms of its resources and its plan's compatibility with the course of history. Whether what has continued all these long decades of time has been a success or a failure, in the magnitude in which either the failure or success have existed, one can describe it only as a strategic failure or success.

This bitter fact must not be absent from our minds at any moment; nor must we close our eyes, either, to the facts and developments of the Arab-Zionist struggle under any excuse or pretext, no matter how difficult, cruel and painful these facts might be. The first condition for the success of the confrontation lies in an accurate, scientific, clear perception of the nature of the struggle underway and the nature of the parties to it, their goals and the objective and subjective conditions through which they function and act.

Here we do not need to say or assert that source of the failure the Arab party has suffered in this struggle never consisted of weakness in the preparation of the masses and their vanguard forces in exerting themselves, making sacrifices and suffering. Perhaps the best proof of that is that the accursed 40th anniversary of the establishment of Israel is occurring these days in the context of the inflammation of the struggle between the Palestinian people and this cancerous entity planted on the soil of their nation. Here the blessed uprising in our occupied nation is entering its sixth month without letup or interruption in one of the most important of heroic, scarcely paralleled people's confrontations.

However, in spite of this obvious fact, the question is still at issue: why have we failed so far in crushing this Zionist brutality, supported from its head to its toes by everything the imperialist machine and arsenal have produced? Why haven't the succeeding generations managed to force this plan, which has succeeded in realizing a new expansionist leap every few years, to retrench?

This of course makes it mandatory for us first of all as Palestinian national and revolutionary forces and secondly as Arab national, progressive and ethnic forces to take a pause in which to review this long experience and to seek the source of the error which has brought about this historic failure that has been inflicted on the Arab party, because diagnosing the roots of the problem is the proper beginning for any true takeoff, far removed from any fear of pursuing such a comprehensive critical review and far removed from political reactions and distraught learning which prompt a flight backward and forward, and because the enormous events and accumulated expertise may become a cause for profound, programmed learning and the true deriving of benefit from expertise whose price has been paid in blood and grievous sacrifices.

Israel has waged its wars against the Arabs within the framework of a comprehensive strategy of clear goals and features. It drew up the outlines and general constants of this more than 9 decades ago. In the context of the same comprehensive strategy, Israel has waged the struggle to build up an economic-social-scientific-technological base while building up a developed military force which relies on the theory of a strong chain, not a central link—a theory whose premise is that the strength of a chain is no greater than the strength of the weakest link in it. Therefore the effort is made to strengthen all the links in the chain, and not to be content with a strong central link with other weak ones. Therefore the notion of "strength," in accordance with this theory, has been only a comprehensive expression of strength in its economic, human, social, scientific, technological and military sense, which imposes various probabilities in the relationship with the imperialist center, seeks to convert the "borrowed strength" into "intrinsic strength," assumes, with respect to the antagonistic group, the Arab group, the best use of its existing, foreseeable and probably resources, and acts on this basis.

Perhaps here is where the reason lies for the enemy's success in attaining the status of a major regional country which is the "modern" expression of the Old Testament notion of "greater Israel"—not in the recognized geographical sense, the sense which has not been separate from overall Zionist strategic calculations, but in the modern sense of the notion of "strength."

In the face of this, what has been the image of the Arab group, which has constituted the other side of the equation of the inflamed struggle in the region since the beginning of this century?

We will not talk at length about the failure and treason of the forces of reaction. The modern history of the region is charged with an ill-starred record which merely refers to its most conspicuous stages, beginning with the reactionary stance of conspiracy against the 6-month strike of 1936, passing through the same stance during the revolution of 1939, analogous to the discredited farcical impotent role in the 1948 war, and ending with the whole well-known record after that date.

What we want to refer to in this article is precisely the position and the strategic policy which the Arab national group followed during these 4 decades of confrontation.

Did this group have a comprehensive clearly-defined strategy of confrontation with evident goals under whose guidance it would function and by which it would be guided?

The plain, categorical answer is of course not at all.

Much might be said regarding the reasons for the absence of such a comprehensive strategy and conduct, in the mistaken belief that such a strategy existed—which is more grievous. However, what must be asserted is that the Arab national bourgeoisie, which assumed dominance of the Arab national liberation movement at the start of the second half of this century, was not, by virtue of its backward, deficient nature, able to formulate such a strategy, and the forces of the "revolutionary alternative," the class alternative to this leadership, in the context of its ongoing dilemma, have not been able to this day to formulate such a strategy, so how can we envision the presence of a comprehensive common strategy of confrontation through which the various efforts and powers of the forces of the Arab national liberation movement might be unified?

Even the Nasserist plan, which, no matter what is said and has been said about it, provided an opportunity for the first time for the Arab liberation movement to seize the initiative in the region—even this plan did not rely on a comprehensive strategy, by the admission of its leader and founder, the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

In light of this fact, how can we envision the possibility of the Arab group's victory in this overall struggle? To what extent is it possible to speak of the seriousness of the plan of confrontation whose banners have been raised by numerous successive forces and detachments during the past 40 years?

We raise these questions and queries bearing in mind that time is blood and that we do not have the right to engage in the game of right and wrong.

We raise such questions and queries in the form of an appeal to all our forces, detachments and intellectuals to give this vital, decisive matter the importance it deserves.

We raise these questions and queries without the illusion that what we are raising will not entail an adequate, healing answer so much as constitute a modest contribution to the crystallization of a comprehensive strategy of confrontation of Zionist and imperialist-reactionary brutality.

As we have pointed out, the true starting point for a proper takeoff is embodied in knowing the nature of the enemy: Who is this enemy we are confronting? What does he want? What cards of strength and points of weakness does he possess? Where are our errors in the experience? Where have we been correct? How may we subsequently carry out the process of mobilization, organization and the marshalling of our resources and forces in this fierce struggle?

How Can We Understand the Israeli Enemy?

The starting point in any comprehensive strategy is embodied in knowing the nature of the enemy. We must have an advanced, integrated, scientific understanding of our enemy. I say a scientific understanding because many ideas we hold concerning this entity can be characterized as divination and notions of trivialization from the past, such as those which divide the world into two camps of absolute good and absolute evil and do not see differences, diversion and the multiplicity of colored areas between them, or those which ceaselessly talk about the "predicament of the enemy," his suffocating crisis, his floundering and his confusion, and whose proponents, deliberately or not, give the impression that this enemy's collapse has become a matter of time and nothing else.

I say an advanced understanding because we are faced with a changing, evolving entity. Therefore we cannot content ourselves with positions from the past and our forms of knowledge cannot stop with them. The Israel of today is not the Israel of 1948, and we must, through our forms of knowledge, keep abreast of this entity's movement and not turn our preoccupations and desires into theoretical proof through which we can twist the facts around.

I say also an integrated understanding, because we are not dealing with a problem confined to an enemy estimated at 3 million Jews, more or less, or a lot, because the roots of the problem lies in the interconnection of this plan—the enemy—with two central links which must be taken into consideration upon any study or investigation.

The first is represented by the world Zionist movement which supplies this entity with the vital essence of its life in human, material and spiritual terms.

The second is the imperialist center without which it is not possible to understand this entity's course of development and the laws of its development; similarly, we cannot probe to the depths of the strategic horizons whose banner it raises.

It need not be asserted that the importance of these two links does not rule out the importance of studying the subject in its connection to the course and development of "Arab reaction," which in this entity has found the optimum instrument for containing and obstructing the development of the region and a means that can be relied on for preserving their survival in the center of power.

Thus the importance of scientific, advanced, integrated knowledge of this entity in its capacity as the first link in the process of formulating a comprehensive strategy of confrontation is apparent.

The starting point in our attempt to offer a "realistic picture" of this entity proceeds from the admission, our admission, that the Israel of 1988 is in no way the Israel of 1948 by economic or social standards or by military-strategic standards—not to speak of the human criterion.

During these 4 decades a series of quantitative developments has occurred which has placed this entity in the position of the "major regional power," with all the changes that have followed from that not just in the internal, Israeli, framework but also in the framework of its relations with the Zionist and imperialist centers and in the context of its view of the limits of the regional and international role assigned to it.

In order for the significance of the conclusion we want to reach in this statement to become clear, we will content ourselves here with a brief consideration of the most prominent developments in this change in the position and role which have devolved upon Israel, within the limits of that which lies within—the socioeconomic structure—and in the context of this entity's foreign policy and higher strategy.

First, The Truth about Economic Conditions in the Zionist Entity

Before entering into an observation and analysis of the most prominent economic indices in Israel, it is worth pausing to consider the general strategic framework

through which and in whose context the overall economic transformations in this entity have taken place. It is also worthwhile pausing to consider the most prominent exceptional ancillary factors which have caused its economic growth and development to proceed in accordance with curves that are not often seen in the circumstances of normal development of any society.

Israel is an entity in transformation, indeed rapid transformation and change, on the basis of the "special" circumstances through which it is living and developing. Therefore the notions from the past, necromancy and rigid hypotheses by which this entity is viewed are of absolutely no use in understanding its present reality and inevitably lead the people possessing them to the most grievous consequences.

In accordance with this view, it is possible to say that Israel has succeeded in reformulating its relations with the imperialist center on the basis of a partner-instrument instead of a hired instrument, and, in the light of this, it is possible to talk about Israel no longer as the burden but rather as the strategic storehouse and lucrative partner of world imperialism.

The 1967 war in particular gave added depth to this equation in the relationship between the Zionist plan and the imperialist one, since the former came to have a clearer, greater, distinctive character in the framework of the latter. The war also created a serious change in Israel's view of itself and its role, which grew deeper after the 1973 war; this we can infer from the talk of some Israeli strategic theoreticians who have called for a political strategic safety valve which is of great steadfastness in the context of higher national security and strategy theory, with the goal of "giving a small, weak country from the standpoint of quantity, like Israel, the power of a great, powerful country." That is the situation which provides it not only with the probable power of the means of combat Israel possesses to destroy but rather the entire chain, whose military power constitutes only one of its links. Therefore, the appeal has been made to strengthen all the links in the chain, since "a chain, as is well known, is no stronger than the weak link in it."

The essential thing, as far as what has previously been expressed in the words of some Israeli strategists goes, is that Israel is no longer a military institution which possesses a country, but a country which possesses its military institutions. While the latter are the stronger link, it has become necessary to raise the level of the other economic, social, human and scientific links to the same level of strength. It is exactly this equation which has governed this entity's economic programs. Dealings with the imperialist and Zionist centers have taken place from the perspective of this view. Economic aid has come to have a strategic value which is no less important and serious than military aid, contrary to normal relations between the countries of the imperialist camp and the countries of the various parties, the third world.

In the context of this vision, the strategic scheme, all natural, financial, human, economic, and marketing resources have been put to use in service of the plan of the "great regional power." How did that take place? What has been the upshot of the past 40 years?

In Israel's situation, it is not possible to ignore the decisive role the foreign world played in providing a decisive share of (1) human resources, specifically those that were highly qualified, (2) ceaselessly flowing capital, which has led to a degree of capitalization that domestic accumulation would not in any way have been able to provide, and (3) marketing facilities which concluded with Israel's nearly total assimilation into the imperialist market, on very suitable terms. These prompt the conviction that Israel was dealt with in its capacity as a country of the imperialist center, not one of the countries of the surrounding environment.

No two people will quarrel over these facts. However, the point which has not been given the attention and influence it merits and still leads to some obscurity among a number of the milieux concerned is how were these resources used and how did Israel put this aid to use in service of its special plan, which is connected to and parallel to the general imperialist plan?

First, financial resources:

During the years 1950-1984, tremendous financial resources flowed into Israel, estimated at about \$92 billion in 1980 prices, more than two-thirds of which came from the United States, followed by West Germany, the international Zionist movement and other aid, loans and gifts from various imperialist countries.

During the same period, \$96 billion in 1980 prices were also allocated to investment domestically, which indicates that financial remittances from abroad went not into consumption or unproductive areas but into capital formation. This figure is equal to one-quarter the national product in Israel and is one of the highest percentages in the world.

Thus we reach an important deduction, whose gist is that the increase in the burden of security on Israel has not prevented it from building an advanced economic base to which one-quarter its national product has been allocated.

Getting further into the details of the spending of these massive sums, we observe that \$64 billion, that is, about two thirds of the total capital formation, were invested in fields of a productive nature, the manufacture of equipment, tools and so forth, while the family sector's share, individuals' possession of finished goods and buildings, did not come to more than one-third of total capital formation.

A rise in the degree of capitalization in various productive sectors resulted from that.

In agriculture, for example, the ratio of irrigated lands rose from 18 percent in 1949 to about 50 percent in 1984. During this period mechanization progressed and the number of agricultural machines rose from 1,300 in 1949 to 29,900 in 1984. Israeli per capita water consumption rose to 260 liters a day as compared with 60 liters for Palestinian citizens on the West Bank.

In the electricity sector, output rose from 364 million kilowatts in 1950 to 1,209 million kilowatts in 1984, more than two thirds of which goes to the sector of industry.

Nuclear technology has entered this field from its widest gates, in the generation of electricity and the desalination of water.

In the sector of industry, \$15 billion was invested from 1950 to 1984, close to 11 billion of which went to equipment of modern technology. Thus this sector's share rose from 13 percent of gross capital formation in the sixties to 15 percent in the seventies and 21.3 percent in the eighties.

The concentration of investment in this sector has reached an important record level, since for every industrial worker there are industrial investments estimated at about \$50,000 on the average, which is an extremely high rate.

Second, Human Resources and the Qualified Workforce in the Israeli Economy

Alongside the intensified capitalization the Israeli economy has witnessed, the workforce available to this economy has been employed in the most competent way possible, with respect to new immigrants and ones in whom the character of advanced academic qualification prevails, owing to the use of science in raising the level of qualification of resident workers, through the creation of new areas and the opening of new doors to benefit from women's labor on a large scale, and finally through the employment of cheap Arab manpower lacking accreditation to perform the third-class jobs which the Israeli laborer is too aloof to perform, and it is developing in the direction of work in fields which require competence and specialization.

During the period from 1948 to 1984, the number of people immigrating to Israel came to 1.75 million, of whom 1.4 million settled in Palestine. The ratio of those who are of working age and possess high qualification ranged from 25 to 31 percent in the years 1974-1984.

In the light of the information available on the composition of the immigration, we can say that during the period 1955-1984 from 49,000 to 65,000 people possessing high qualifications reached Israel. Of these, there were from 18,000 to 26,000 engineers and 10,000 to 13,800 doctors.

The period between 1972 and 1984 witnessed the most extensive flow of immigrants with high qualifications. While the total immigrants during this period came to 35 percent of the total immigrants between 1955 and 1984, the ratio of doctors and engineers came to about 70 percent of the total number of doctors and engineers who had flowed into Israel in the years 1955-1984.

These figures mean, simply, a complete revolution, at no cost, in the composition of the Israeli workforce which will have the most pervasive effect in the formulation of the Israeli view with respect to the economy or high strategy.

In addition to that, the educational institutions inside Israel have been subject to constant development and expansion. They produce thousands of graduates a year and one can derive evidence for that from the average years of study among persons above 14 years of age. While the ratio of those who had acquired 16 years of study or more to the total population of more than 14 years of age came to 3.6 percent in 1961, it rose in 1970 to 4.1 percent, in 1975 to 7 percent, in 1980 to 8.5 percent then to 9.8 percent in 1984.

That is, the increase in the magnitude of educational resources came to close to threefold, also as a minimum.

The most important results which educational development on the one hand and the internal composition of the population in Israel on the other realized included a rise in the ratio of the work force within it, coming to 37 percent of the total Jewish population (22 percent from the Palestine of 1948). This is a high ratio and the employment of Israeli women on a broad scale has an important influence on it: this came to 67.5 women for every hundred men in 1984 while in 1972 it was 52 women for every 100 Jewish men. Meanwhile the rate among Arab women in 1984 came to 17.5 for every 100 Arab male workers.

The most important evidence of the development in the rate of employment of Jewish women is the shift of 112,200 persons from the status of unproductive consumers to that of producers thanks to the rise in the ratio of women's participation in work. This in itself constitutes great compensation for the nonproductive workforce, especially in the security area. This figure is also close to the volume of Arab labor "imported" from the areas occupied in 1967, whose number, in 1984, came to 125,000 hired workers whose labor in Israel offers Israeli planners an opportunity to redistribute Israeli manpower in various economic branches and direct them toward the most advanced productive stages, while the Arab workers are absorbed at the bottom of the productive ladder.

Thus it is clear to us that Israel has not just had the benefit of highly qualified human resources whose flow from abroad constituted a revolution in the composition of Israeli labor, but that it has also worked to provide the

maximum conditions for the employment of manpower domestically, since it has worked to raise the level of its accreditation, increase women's participation in it and benefit from the opportunity Arab labor flowing in from the occupied bank and strip offers.

Third, Marketing Facilities for the Israeli Economy

While Israel has succeeded in guaranteeing a flow of intruding financial and human resources and in employing and using them in accordance with a scientific plan, with its eye fixed on this entity's higher strategic goals, how has Israel succeeded in solving the problem of the market?

In the course of answering, we can observe three ways in which Israel has remedied the problem of the market.

The first way is expansion of the domestic market through the growth in the population, natural on one hand and resulting from the flow of the immigrants pouring in on the other.

Above and beyond the rise in the level of capitalization and the level of employment, which in turn has helped raise demand for goods and services and led to the stimulation of the economic cycle:

Israel has resorted to a method that has been followed, which is to engage in an inflationist policy that is aimed at exchanging one pattern of social behavior, the propensity to save, in favor of another pattern, the spending of incomes and their diversion to fixed goods. Israel has fought the effects of retrenchment through an inflationary policy, a method that is well known in capitalist economies.

The second way is expansion of the market in the colonial manner, through occupation, since it has become well known that Israel faced its first and most serious structural economic crisis, the crisis of the glut of production, on the eve of the 1967 war, in the wake of the completion of the comprehensive industrialization program which it carried out with German reparations funds.

The market of the areas occupied in 1967, with their resources and consumer power, constitutes between one quarter and one third the Israeli market itself. It is an assured market because it is almost monopolized by Israel, since that dominates 90 percent of the occupied territories' imports and Israel's total exports to it came to \$637.5 million in 1984, while they were \$50.9 million in 1968.

The deficit in the balance of payments between Israel and the occupied territories improved from \$36.7 million in 1968 to a \$442.1-million surplus in the balance of trade in favor of Israel in 1984. This surplus covered 17.5 percent of the total Israeli balance of payments deficit in 1984.

The areas occupied in 1967 are considered the biggest single importer from Israel, after the United States, and their economic weight, in this sense, can be compared with the main blocs in the world, since they absorb 33 and 39 percent of the Israeli exports the European Common Market and the United States, respectively, absorbed in 1984.

The Third Way, Assimilation Into the Imperialist Market:

Israel has succeeded in entering the international market on the conditions and via the facilities most suited to its economy, and in a gradual manner which was compatible and in conformity with the magnitude of the development which occurred in the Israeli economic structure.

As a result of these exceptional facilities which Israel acquired from the imperialist countries, since it was treated as one of the countries of the center, the Israeli economy realized additional leaps forward.

Israeli exports to the countries of the European market between 1974 and 1984 rose from \$398 million [sic] to \$890 million, that is, by 170 percent, while Israel's imports from the market rose by only 73 percent.

As regards the facilities the United States provided, these helped increase Israeli exports to the American market from 1974 to 1984 by 445 percent, while Israel's imports from the American market during the same period rose by no more than 135 percent.

Through a simple calculation, it is clear that the practical results of the agreements between Israel and the (imperialist) outer world consisted of an additional increase in Israeli exports, amounting to \$1,614,500,000; of this, an additional \$932 million were a result of American facilities and \$682.5 million a result of European facilities. This added gross figure is equal to one quarter of Israeli exports to all areas of the world.

More than that, this amount is equal to 253 percent of all the Israeli exports the areas occupied in 1967 absorb—that is, in other words, Israel's agreement with the European Common Market and Israel have the same significance for Israeli exports the 1967 war had.

In light of the foregoing, we can summarize by stating that Israel over the past decades has been able to use the flood of financial and human resources flowing to it from abroad to the maximum extent, to benefit to the maximum extent from the marketing facilities available to it as well, and, subsequent to that, in the framework of its own view, reformulate its higher strategy, not just in the military context but also in the comprehensive context of the notion of power, with the economy, technology, science and so forth that entails.

This new formulation has led to a review of the priorities and areas of preference in the domestic economic structure, since industry occupies a pioneering position and since the electricity and electronics industries occupy a position of growing importance in overall industrial production (17.2 percent in 1982 as contrasted with 4.3 percent in 1965).

Since the workforce is oriented toward extreme concentration (1.5 percent of the industrial installations employ 45.3 percent of the industrial workforce) and since Israel has succeeded in raising work productivity per worker in fixed prices three and a half times over in the years 1950-84:

All this will have the greatest effect in presenting the Israeli economy with the problems of the market once again: this has come close to exhausting the marketing opportunities available to it, inspiring the belief that Israel will hasten toward normalization with its Arab environment, peacefully, by war or by both means jointly.

Are we in any way exaggerating if we say, after this, that "the theory of the strong chain" has actually been carried out in Israel, now that we have seen the magnitude of the modernization and development that have affected the economic structure?

Does any doubt linger among any of us that the notion of strength, for the enemy, has for a long time transcended its economic scope and entered into the broader economic-social-scientific-technological framework?

Will we take these facts in consideration in our higher strategic calculations, whether we rely on the policy of long-range people's war or the policy of strategic balance, or will we remain the prisoners of notions from the past concerning this enemy?

Any comprehensive, thorough reading of the significance of the figures cited concerning the actual economic situation in Israel prompts the need for deep thinking about this enemy and deep thinking about our strategy for a comprehensive confrontation of his schemes and higher strategy.

Second: Social Transformations and Their Effect on the Contradictions of the Society

Since Israel was the offspring of a Zionist-imperialist plan which in terms of history covers more than a century of time, and from its first years has had its sharply-delineated strategic vision; since Israel from the first years of its establishment has been given most favored nation status by imperialist circles, through military support, economic aid and subsequently marketing facilities; and since this entity has from the first moment also absorbed the land, houses, possessions and accumulation achieved by the Palestinians in their

nation: because of all this, the enemy's nation has found additional weapons by which to confront the domestic social problems it has faced in the course of the past 40 years.

This entity was destined to possess massive economic-financial power through many sources, domestic and foreign, which enabled it, and still enables it, to face the social problems standing in its way and to provide solutions for them in a manner which does not stop at the point of keeping them from accumulating but rather is oriented toward alleviating the severity of this burden as well.

It was natural that the Zionist and world imperialist movements should do everything in their power to induce waves of new immigrants to come to our country and to provide the most comfortable and suitable alternative "for them in their original nation." Therefore this entity's higher strategy required "the failure to permit the exacerbation of social problems and indeed the provision of conditions of a standard of living for Jewish inhabitants which would be on a par with its European equivalent on the average and would tangibly exceed the situation which exists in the neighboring Arab environment."

The situation did not just stop at the point of offering inducements for immigration—which as far as Zionism goes is a crucial ideological and political point of emphasis; rather, the situation, even before the establishment of Israel, came to require the solution of all social problems in order to prevent the fragmentation of the Zionist institution—the Jewish Agency first of all, then the country arising on our territory afterward.

A number of factors were made available to the Zionist institution from the beginning which to a large extent helped maintain its cohesiveness.

First, a historic factor, because of the length of the period separating the beginning of the flow of immigration from the declaration of the establishment of the country, which was no less than 40 years. Of these, 30 were under the aegis of the British mandate, which oversaw and facilitated the task of assimilation in the broadest context.

Second is the organizational framework through which the immigration took place. The World Zionist Organization which held its first conference in Basel, Switzerland after 35 years of preparatory work, with all the branches, organizations and institutions it possessed, played its role in reformulating the "Jewish consciousness" and orienting it in accordance with its strategic plan in its various stages.

Third is the political framework which gave the institutional framework a high degree of attention and facilities. By "political framework" we mean the legal instrument of the mandate, which made the mandate

government's first task oversight of "the national home for the Jews" in accordance with the Balfour Declaration. From this resulted the Jewish Agency's performance of the role of the "state within a state" through its boards and organizations, and the activity of the Zionists in our country became the activity of a state, not the activity of individuals and boards.

Fourth is the quality of the immigrants and their breakdown by various areas. It is true that the immigrants came from four areas of the world, but before 1948, 66 percent of them came from just four countries: Poland alone was responsible for about 35 percent of the total immigrants before 1948. This means that we have been talking of large, homogeneous immigrant blocs.

All these elements caused the Zionist entity to rely on a system of political, economic, social, military and religious structures and institutions which were formed before its establishment and assumed concrete form after it, and were the basis for playing a decisive role in attracting immigrants and reducing the effect of their distinctiveness and the difference in their plans and their cultures.

After the establishment of the entity, the enemy was furnished with Palestinian territory and what was on it—a resource whose value it is impossible to assess. Then the flow of financial aid from abroad, which up to 1982 was estimated at about \$92 billion, proceeded to do its work in alleviating the severity of the contradictions and discrepancies of the society.

All this was put to use in the context of an integrated strategic scheme which ultimately led to the crystallization of the Israeli social option. By this we mean the pursuit of a social policy which does not permit the exacerbation of the severity of social tensions, keeps them from exploding, maintains a high standard of living for the population as a whole, reduces the magnitude of the social gap among the various classes of the society and fails to permit the transformation of the country into a country with a distinctive minority.

Here it is possible to mention a group of factors which coalesced in forging this social option for the enemy nation:

First, the maturity of the party and political institution and its accurate knowledge of what it wanted to attain.

Second, the driving motives of the political elite's thinking in this area had their decisive, determining role in the ideology.

Third, the presence of an adequate distance between the government and the political elite and consequently the higher interests of the Zionist plan, on the one hand, and the traditional financial and social centers of pressure on the other.

Fourth, the nature of the political system, specifically the electoral system, which allowed all contradictions to express themselves and consequently exercise their influence within the limits determined by their magnitude and electoral weight.

Fifth, the deep-rooted nature of European values, in academic and social terms.

Sixth, the Zionist plan as an open potential for expansion and the implantation of that in the programs of the Zionist parties, which made the intrinsic development of capabilities mandatory.

Seventh, the establishment of the Zionist plan on the principle of aggression actually carried out or hoped to be carried out.

Eighth, the importance of immigration as a decisive, determining factor which has imposed the need to offer a model of assimilation guaranteeing the inducement of additional immigrants to come in.

Ninth, the dangers of reverse immigration, which is increasing subsequent to the increase in various pressures on a given class of the population.

Tenth, the dangers of a rise in the degree of internal contradictions in the context of the high degree of contradiction with the outer world.

All these factors helped draw up the enemy country's social option and they all hastened to make it possible for this entity to lessen the severity of its internal problems and keep them from reaching the point of eruption.

The enemy's country sought to propose various solutions to these problems and connected the security problems to the problems of the future. The draft, for example, was not just a means for answering specific security needs but also an effective means for creating homogeneity and harmony, and the priorities of economic development at each stage of this entity's development were subjected to the interests of the integrated strategic plan, which left no room for weak links by which the entire chain could be broken.

The military, educational, religious, media and educational institutions were mobilized to this end. The educational institution had a noteworthy, distinctive role among them all.

We have noted in what we have cited above how the enemy achieved tangible progress in building a qualified workforce and raising the level of higher education and increased the share of women's participation in work and the rate of employment. This, in its totality, led to a rise in the standard of living of the Zionist settlers whose significance we must be aware of.

It might be said that the credit for this high standard of living goes to the direct usurpation of our people and nation the colonialists engage in and the exorbitant wages they receive for performing an imperialist role in the region. This statement is correct but it is also correct that the investment of these exceptional foreign incomes has been subjected to an aware, planned strategy through which the Israeli internal environment has come to have a great, important role in the production of resources and the social problems have become less aggravated along with it.

This of course does not mean that the Zionist enemy has succeeded in eliminating the social discrepancies among the various classes of its population. This is an impossible task in the context of a capitalist society and it is not called for in the context of the strategic Zionist plan, which preserves a special, important role for the private sector.

However, the point which must be referred to is that the severity of the social problems this entity is facing has not become as intense as the Arab media deliberately or not sometimes portrays it, and, which is most important, it has not reached the point where it becomes exacerbated automatically or the result of spontaneous development. Rather, their aggravation appears contingent on the growth of the role the Palestinian and Arab nationalist and progressive forces play in shaking the stability of this entity.

For example, there has been much talk about the problem of Oriental Jews in the Zionist entity. Although they do indeed occupy the third level on the Israeli social ladder, after the Jews born in Palestine and the Western Jews, the gap, as the statistical data show, is starting to shrink. Our desires and dreams of the explosion of this entity's problems may not be satisfied with this, but desire and dreams are one thing and objective fact is something else.

Let us take as an example the educational level. We note that the ratio of Western Jews who have had 16 years of study in 1984 came to 14.5 percent while this came to 3.6 percent among Oriental Jews. Here an important discrepancy exists. However, it is to be noted that the rate of increase in this category among Western Jews was about 45 percent between 1974 and 1984 while the rate among Oriental Jews came to 90 percent, and the gap, rather than being 5.3 to 1 as was the case in 1974, came in 1984 to 4 to 1; this causes us to contemplate the situation at the end of the eighties or perhaps at the end of this century. How will the picture be—further aggravation or further convergence of social levels?

Let us take another measurement, women's venturing to work. Among Western Jews the situation in 1984 was 66 working women for every 100 working men and among Oriental Jews the ratio was 44 percent. This is also a big discrepancy, but the increase in women's participation

in work increased by 34 percent among Western Jews and by 43.6 percent among Oriental Jews between 1974 and 1984. We must envision the situation by the end of this century.

These are some indices, and there are many others besides. This makes it mandatory that we not be confident in and place reliance on the exacerbation of this entity's domestic problems, and, likewise, not stop at uttering the expressions "crisis and dilemma" without closely examining the description of this entity's situation, because that will have the effect of alienating oneself from the vision of the truth as it is, and here we will have succumbed to a blatant, grievous error.

We must also acknowledge that the enemy has succeeded in raising his settlers' standard of living, for the reasons we have mentioned. The ratio of families which live with two or more persons per room on the average declined from 56 percent in 1957 to 9.6 percent in 1984, and the ratio of families living with one or fewer persons per room on the average has increased, reaching 57 percent in 1984.

That also is one of numerous criteria which there is no room to mention, concerning the possession of finished goods by the family or private cars, whose ownership rose from 4.3 percent of families in 1960 to 53 percent of families owning their own cars in 1984.

In order to escape the problem of inequity in income distribution, Israel has used two basic methods. First is embodied in the imposition of an escalating tax system which comes to 100 percent in the case of some high incomes.

Second is the exemption of productive goods from taxes in order to encourage the private sector to invest and give it an incentive to help create the desired development in means of production.

Therefore, it has been possible to control exaggerated deviations from the policy of equity in income distribution in accordance with higher political needs and the higher interest of the Zionist plan.

The only people who constitute an exception to this rule are the Arabs, who have been laboring under the Zionist occupation since 1948, since notwithstanding their assimilation into this entity's productive cycle they have occupied fifth place, the bottom of the Zionist entity's social ladder, following the African Jews, who occupied fourth place after the Oriental Jews.

With a simple comparison between the conditions of the Arabs and the conditions of the Oriental Jews, the magnitude of the persecution and suppression which has been inflicted on them through the Zionist entity's racist policy becomes apparent.

As regards housing, for example: density per room among African Jews comes to 1.29, while among the Arabs it comes to 2.12 percent and the ratio of Arab families living three or more in a room comes to 4.26 percent while this ratio among African Jews does not come to 1.8 percent.

Regarding finished goods, the ratio of Arab families owning a television set is no more than 67.5 percent, according to 1981 statistics.

While the ratio of Arab working women in 1984 came to 17.5 percent of the number of Arab working males, the rate among African Jews was 84.4 percent.

These figures are good as an example of the extent of the persecution, tyranny and repression which lie on the shoulders of our citizens under occupation as compared even with the classes lowest in the Jewish social ladder, which reveals the loathesome racist character of Israeli policy within what is called "the green belt."

In summary, we can say that additional sources of income have been available to the enemy, which has raised the volume of wealth to be distributed, and that has enabled him to reconcile his security and development needs without disrupting the settlers' standard of living. This situation has caused the various Jewish classes to avoid falling under effective social pressure. To the contrary, social conditions have improved constantly and at high rates. The availability of resources from abroad and the rise in labor productivity domestically have helped him in that—resources whose distribution is connected to a tax policy that is carried out stringently and has the goal of narrowing social gaps on the one hand and on the other preserving the status the private sector occupies through laws preserving the productive character of resources and the profits accruing to this sector, which is functioning in the scope of the interests of the country, and not the opposite.

These are the most prominent features of the Zionist entity's social policy and the most prominent transformations which have occurred to it in this field. As is apparent, here, once again, the higher Zionist strategic goals stand out in their capacity as the regulator, motive force and political and social focal point which must be studied with a special degree of care and attention.

Third: The Development of Israel's Strategic Thinking and Military Ability

In the socio-economic area, also, the field of strategic thinking and Israel's military abilities has witnessed a noticeable shift and development throughout the past 40 years. Along with that, it has become necessary to view these newly-arising conditions in a comprehensive manner. It is sufficient not to be swept along by our old knowledge and analyses, but rather to enter into the

heart of these transformations, evaluate them and give concrete form to a countervailing strategy for confronting them based on science and facts not on dreams and conceptions.

Perhaps the great turning point which constituted a total turnaround in Israeli strategic thinking was embodied in the results of the 1973 war, to the point where it appeared to Israel that the facts of the June 1967 war and its army's low-cost, overwhelming victory over the Arab armies were no longer valid after 1973 and that it was possible to reduce the magnitude of the gap in the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel in a few years which enabled the Arabs to use the inclination in an effective manner through which the danger of a disruption of the balance of power on the Arabs' behalf had become an actual fact and a possibility, unless a broad adjustment were to take place in Israeli policy.

Therefore, the goal of this Israeli strategy after the 1973 war was not only to preserve the ratio of the balance of power which tilted in the favor of the enemy but also to expand it as well and work to create a technological time discrepancy which it would be difficult for the Arabs to transcend in the course of a few years.

With this shift which came about in the enemy's strategic thinking, a corresponding shift occurred in Israel's notion of "the balance of power," "the enemy" and "the components of power." That is a change which one can say was not cut off by the roots from the essence of the higher strategy under whose guidance the Zionist plan in Palestine emerged and which it worked to bring to the realm of execution.

National security, to Israel, is an expression synonymous with existence itself. Therefore it is necessary to view "the enemy" with a new eye, not just the existing enemy but also the one who is likely for national, domestic, religious, ideological and scientific reasons. Upon calculating the "balance of power" it is necessary to take that fact into account and in the light of this the calculation of the human and technological element and so forth takes place.

On the basis of that, it is not possible to take a single-sided view of the "components of power" confined to the military aspect, but also to the economic, human and security aspect.

Conduct took place in the light of this view, in the past years, since the scope of action of Israeli power extended to areas remote from the Arab-Israeli "line of contact." We today are hearing about "ideas and plans" which reach the point of striking at the nuclear reactor in Pakistan, out of fear that it will be converted to production of atomic bombs which could threaten the security of this entity in various political circumstances.

In light of this strategy, important transformations occurred in the structure of the Israeli military institution accompanied by more comprehensive transformations in the economic structure, specifically those of them connected to the war industry. Here we will content ourselves with referring to some aspects of the enemy's strategic thinking, which has been reflected on his military abilities.

First, in the human area, since one of the most important lessons of the October war has been derived. That is represented by the need to increase the human capability of the Israeli military institution. The number of Israeli soldiers, conscripts or reserve, was raised, so that Israel became capable of a quantitative mobilization in the combat area at a rate not much below the Arab armies' capacity for this. The number of the Israeli army comes to about a quarter of a million professional soldiers, aside from reserves.

The most important and serious point in this matter is that the Israeli military institution's increase in human power did not occur at the expense of the human power employed in the civilian sector. Indeed, that was compensated for by an increase in the rate of employment, not to speak about the continued suspension of migration and Arab labor.

Thus a great shift occurred in the qualitative level of the human power working in the security sector and the army in the framework of the orientation toward the introduction of further advanced arms and war technology equipment and in the context of the use of the "electron" on a broad scale in the weapons used in the Israeli army.

Second, in the area of arms procurement, since reliance continued to be founded on foreign arms sources while the Israeli army proceeded to absorb domestically manufactured advanced weapons more and more, after the Israeli war industry had covered great strides in supplying the army with its requirements of ammunition and many types of weapons and in introducing the desired modifications on imported and old weapons so that they could be in keeping with the modern level of accelerating technological development and also in keeping with the nature of the circumstances in which these weapons are used.

The most important element, as the enemy's commanders in this field point out, has limited, is limiting and will continue to limit the power of the Israeli army is the element of the means of combat and not the human element. That is, Israel must make its army an increasing power by raising the level of its means of combat, not just by increasing its human power.

All this is taking place in the context of a strategy which has the goal of converting borrowed power into intrinsic power.

The most serious thing on which Israel has ventured in this area is expansion in the use of the electronic dimension in weapons. In terms of defining or accurately hitting the targets—smart ammunition—or in terms of the maximum use of this dimension in managing the security activity and command, surveillance, communications and intelligence, this dimension is the peak of Israel's priorities and its first condition for realizing its strategic qualitative superiority.

Third, war industry, in the context of the "strategy" of the transformation from borrowed power to "intrinsic" power. Israel, from the beginning of the thirties of this century, has worked to start establishing a war industry, and this industry has covered a decisive stride along the road of development.

The Israeli war industry may be categorized in the context of a comprehensive infrastructure which has the goal of strengthening the components of power in the enemy's possession.

Much might be said about the volume of the war output manufactured in Israel, but the most important thing is Israel's entry into the era of the "electron" in the context of the revolution of guidance-controlled ammunition and surveillance, guidance, communications and intelligence equipment.

Although information on this matter is slight, and enters into the numbers of the higher secrets of the state, evidence may be sought from more than one indicator of the level of the advanced step which the enemy has realized in this context.

Perhaps the most prominent of these indicators is the rise in the share of electronics in overall industrial output or in Israel's exports, not to speak about the diverse information in this regard cited by officials and Israel's execution of a number of military operations which reflect the level it has reached in this context.

It remains for us to point out that at a time when the economy plays a decisive role in raising Israel's strategic ability, the Israeli war industry is contributing its role in reviving this entity's economic cycle, since Israel's war exports play an important role in this regard as war industry absorbs an important share of the labor force in Israel.

Fourth, the Israeli enemy's nuclear ability, since the enemy's nuclear option for many years approaches the life of this entity itself and was crowned in 1963 with the construction of the Dimona reactor.

In spite of Israel's talk about the peaceful use of nuclear power, and it is actually used for peaceful purposes, electricity and water desalination, the main goal of the nuclear option was and remains entry into the stage of nuclear terror through the production of the means of comprehensive destruction.

Information was recently disclosed on the Israeli nuclear arsenal, the least pessimistic of which indicates the presence of 20 atomic bombs of the magnitude of Hiroshima with means for transporting them embodied in the Ariha-2 missile, a revised copy of the Pershing-2 missile whose area of action extends south of the Soviet Union.

In the light of the foregoing, we can say that Israel is engaging in a race on two levels, the first the level of nuclear technology and the second the level of traditional weapons, in the quantitative and qualitative contexts. All indications show that Israel has absolute supremacy in the first level. As to the second, traditional weapons, in terms of quantity and quality, there is nothing to indicate that Israel is pursuing an unprofitable race so far.

A look at the enemy's military ability and knowledge of the dimensions of his strategic thinking are necessary if we are thinking in the mentality of people's war or in the mentality of strategic balance, in order to avoid succumbing to the error of belittling this enemy's abilities and the dangers resulting from his threats to the national security of the peoples and countries of the region, or the mistake which seeks to portray this enemy as "the penetrating force which cannot be defeated," in an attempt to justify inability, capitulation and falling into the net of resolutions of liquidation.

Fourth: The Political Transformations in Israel

At the beginning there was the ideology, and from the womb of the European capitalist societies emerged Zionist ideology, and it was transformed into an organized movement which held its first conference at the end of the 19th century. Its notion of the establishment of a "national home for the Jews in Palestine" received official, declared embrace on the part of British imperialism in 1917, reaching the establishment of the Zionist entity in 1948.

Since that date, Zionist ideology has been translated into links and stages, in the form of policies, wars, positions and programs of development and domestic construction. One can say that Zionist ideology with the establishment of the Zionist entity came to have its supplementary executive instruments. It came to have its structures and institutions, to which the society of the settlers is subjected.

As was apparent in our previous review of the economy, society and strategy, this was all subjected to a comprehensive strategic plan, and the gathering of the settlers in our country in the crucible of Zionism in terms of thought and practice proceeded beginning with the subjection to its influences upon adoption of the decision to immigrate to Palestine, proceeding through the plan for assimilation, employment, mobilization, the school, the

media and other Zionist institutions which reformulate the minds of these settlers in order to be in harmony with the higher goals of the society of settlers.

In the light of the special circumstances by which this society was surrounded and the revenues it receives from abroad for its strategic role in the region and what it has done itself in order to preserve this role and guarantee its outcome, and in the light of the special circumstances of the emergence of this entity, since the Old Testament ideological dimension has played a decisive element in this emergence, does the statement that it is not possible, indeed that it is out of the question, to separate Zionism and Israel, become incomprehensible?

The facts of yesterday—the 40 years—and the experiences of the future and the practical vision of the future stress this firm interconnection between Zionism and its entity. The social discrepancies are not relied upon, Zionism is the official ideology of the society which is subject to its influences in various ways and forms, and the community of the settlers benefits to some degree or another from its colonial mission, so then how can one bet on separating Zionism and Israel?

It is enough for us to point out that everything that has been cited about scientific-technological progress has resulted only in barbarism and fascism. The society of science and racist ideology can only produce barbarism of a specific kind, which is precisely what we are observing today on the occupied territories in confrontation of the uprising, and it is precisely what we witnessed over the 4 decades of official, organized terror, collective massacres, murder, dispossession and extermination.

The enemy's accomplishments that have been realized in the economic-social-strategic context which we have talked about have prepared the bases for important transformations on the political level, since major changes have occurred in political thinking, and more important shifts have occurred in the political balance of power in this entity.

While the notion of "greater Israel" is pending today as an actual translation in the words of the Zionist leaders, the first of the goals of this expansionist plan will be to work to absorb the territories occupied in 1976, and the dispute going on between the two major poles of political life in Israel, the Likud and the Maarakh, on this point, is only a dispute regarding the assessment of Israel's ability to do this, its ability to convert the ideology into policy and to start to carry it out in practice on the ground.

All this is taking place in the framework of a domestic political atmosphere which is headed toward the positions of the right and extremism and in the context of an actual policy founded on giving concrete form to the

slogan "greater Israel" gradually, by building the force with all its components or seeking to absorb the Palestinian and Arab territory occupied in 1967 in a total manner.

This prompts us to talk, if only in a brief statement, about the most prominent characteristics of current political life in Israel and the relationship between that and the totality of transformations which have occurred in the structure and composition of this entity.

The first characteristic is the emergence of the phenomenon of rift and merger which has been a historic matter in Israeli party experience. However, the current new matter is that these rifts are taking place from the left to the right and from the right to the far right. The Israeli election lists in the recent Knesset sessions also reflect this.

The second characteristic: although the game of hawks and doves within all the Israeli parties is an old one, what is new in its regard is that the keys of affairs in these parties are being oriented toward the hawkish positions at the expense of the doves.

The third characteristic is the increase in concentration of political life in the direction of the large blocs. While the number of blocs represented in the latest Knesset came to about 15, the share of the two big blocs came to more than two-thirds the votes in the election. This percentage has roughly preserved its constancy since 1969.

The fourth characteristic is the increase in the settlers' acceptance of elections, since the rate in the latest Knesset was 80 percent of the total who have the right to vote.

The fifth characteristic is the escalation of the weight of the right in political life. In the first years of the establishment of the Zionist entity, the right constituted only a modest percentage in comparison with the weight of the Zionist left. Then the gap between them began to shrink and narrow, reaching balance between them, then the dominance of the right in the 1977 elections, then the return of balance in 1984, when the ruling coalition government was formed.

In spite of this balance, preference still has remained with the right, which possesses an important reserve of small extremist right-wing and religious parties which it can resort to to form a new government, as Yitzhak Shamir has threatened repeatedly.

The sixth characteristic is the weakness of the electoral weight of the non-Zionist forces in the Jewish center. The Communist party Rakah with the overwhelming Arab majority obtained only 5,800 Jewish votes in the

last elections, that is, 0.3 percent of the votes of the Jewish voters, as compared with 36 percent for Maarakh, 34.7 percent for the Likud and 1.3 percent for Rabbi Kahane.

The seventh characteristic is the escalation of the share of the religious parties, attaining its highest peak in the 1961 elections then returning to stability in the last two sessions of the Knesset, at about 11 percent of the total votes of the Jewish voters.

The eighth characteristic is the increase in the weight of the Oriental Jews in the latest Knesset, coming to 31 members as compared with eight in the 1961 elections, one third of whom arrived through the Likud and Maarakh groupings, not through the lists bearing their names such as Tami, which obtained no more than 1.5 percent of the votes.

The ninth characteristic is the weakness in the representation of the Arab voters in comparison with their volume. They constitute 10.5 percent of the persons who have the right to vote but they represent only 5.8 percent of the number of members of the Knesset, and this number has not increased since 1965.

The tenth characteristic is the emergence of the phenomenon of the peace camp in Israel in the past 5 years in a manner which draws attention, thanks to the scandal of the criminal policy of the Zionist enemy in Lebanon and the occupied territories and the many internal and external influences which there is no room to discuss here. In spite of the importance of this phenomenon, it does not constitute a violation of the rule which governs political life in Israel, and in no case can we bet on a large role for it in the current stage at least.

A reading regarding the most prominent characteristics of political life in Israel and the transformations which have occurred in it show that it is proceeding alongside economic, social and strategic developments. Regarding the political developments, we see the transformations the population situation has observed due to the immigrant groups which make up Israel being separated more and more from their intrinsic internal composition in favor of assimilation into a larger social formation. That is the question which was decided by material elements which the policy of controlling the social and scientific gap and the gap in living dividing the various groups making up the Jewish inhabitants of Israel created.

The most prominent characteristic of political life in Israel is expansion of the base of the right and the retreat of the positions of the Zionist left. We do not need here to state that the expressions "right" and "left" when the matter is related to Israel entail unified ideological contents, since the essence of the dispute here revolves about the ability to transform the ideological slogan into a political one and the ability to shift the real goal to a declared goal.

Long experience has revealed how much of the essence the agreement is between the two major poles of political life in Israel about everything connected to strategy and the remote goals of the Zionist plan. It has proved that the limits of the dispute do not extend beyond its current political framework and it does not go beyond the limits of the means that must be pursued to arrive at the same objective.

The most prominent example of the validity of the statement we have concluded with might be the attainment of unanimity within the Zionist entity on the constants of the definitive enmity to Palestine as a name, a people, an issue, a revolution, an organization and legitimate rights. It is what appears clearly in the basic programs of the Zionist parties, since Palestine stands out in its character as the total negation of the Zionist idea.

The matter also appears more clearly in the foreign policy the two main poles of Israeli political life have pursued against the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism on the Arab and international stages, which has come as an extension and expression of the domestic policy, which is founded on Zionism in thought and action and comes together with international imperialism in one trench and one position, especially with its more aggressive and reactionary circles.

This in brief is an abridged picture of the most conspicuous tendencies and transformations the Zionist entity has witnessed during the past 4 decades. We have tried to indicate the most important of them, and we do not claim that we have grasped all of them in this article. We have tried to pause in particular before the elements of strength this entity possesses, with the goal in our minds of helping to refute the simplistic, trivializing view of this entity, which seeks to find its description easy in all characterizations and portrayals, rather than the attempt to understand it in a scientific, objective manner, which, in our view, constitutes the first condition, the first prelude, for building the strategy of a comprehensive Palestinian-Arab-internationalist confrontation.

Studies to Which Our People's Fighting Experience over the Four Decades Has Given Concrete Form

While we are intending to talk on the occasion of the ill-starred 40th anniversary of the establishment of the state of Israel, we can only pause, if only briefly, before some of the most prominent of what we could label the lessons and mistakes which have accompanied the course of the national and domestic Palestinian and Arab confrontation of the Zionist invasion over the course of more than half a century of time.

If it is true that the starting point in such pauses for reflection must of necessity proceed from "knowledge of the enemy" in a good, scientific, integrated, comprehensive manner, and if it is also true that this knowledge seems more necessary in the light of the "tremendous

false amount" of knowledge of this enemy, and in the light of the policy of ignorance and promotion of ignorance "followed by more than one hostile party," if all this is true, it is also true that this pause of ours will be completed by observing the most prominent breaches and mistakes we have committed during this period of time.

Knowledge of the enemy and review of the journey in a stringent, critical fashion are two basic conditions which must be provided to give concrete form to a comprehensive strategy of confrontation which will rise to the level of the challenges the Zionist-imperialist plan is flinging into the faces of us all.

The first of these lessons and errors is the national and domestic controversy in the equation of the struggle with the Zionist enemy and how this extremely important issue has been dealt with.

There is no doubt that this issue has historically played a prominent, major role in drawing up the Palestinian journey, with its progress and retreat, to the point where it has become possible to say that any mistake in viewing the national and domestic equation in Palestinian action, in which one would prevail over the other and override it, will have the most serious and harmful results on the Palestinian struggle.

Perhaps the history of the Palestine cause in this framework is replete with many items of evidence which affirm the veracity of the statement we have concluded with.

In 1936, the Arab reactionary stand, and the Hashemite one in particular, helped thwart the longest comprehensive people's strike, which reached the point of "civil disobedience," in the history of our people, and in 1939 the Arab reactionary regimes participated in thwarting the revolution which had flared up in Palestine and through some Palestinian leadership circles worked to spread illusions and erroneous and dangerous gambles about the intentions of the colonial mandate authorities.

The same tragic spectacle was repeated in 1948 when the Arab armies under the command of Prince 'Abdallah entered Palestine and asked the Palestinians to rely on the role of the Arab armies for the liberation of their country from "Zionist filth," the well-known farce took place, and Palestine was lost, in spite of our people's resistance and in spite of the heroism of the Palestinian perseverance.

Since that date, the relationship between the domestic and the national entered the realm of erroneous treatment, since for numerous considerations the national dimension of the Palestine issue was made to override its essential domestic dimension and adding to the complexity of the matter was the entry of Jordanian reaction into the conspiracy of effacement, extermination and appropriation of our people's national identity.

Since it is not possible in this article to observe the development which occurred to the view of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement of this matter, including our own view, we will content ourselves here with observing the most conspicuous stages through which this development process has passed as far as we as a popular front are concerned and before that as a movement of Arab nationalists.

The First Stage.

This is the stage extending from the year of the catastrophe to the year of the defeat (1948-1967), in which a clear overruling occurred by the national element of the domestic element. We had been functioning in the context of the movement of Arab nationalists at that time, and perhaps the reason for such an erroneous view lies in the totality of factors connected to the level of our development at that time such as the spread of the liberationist nationalist tide and its assumption of a clear turn in its enmity to imperialism, which the Nasirist tide expressed in its most advanced forms.

We made the national element overrule the domestic one in the struggle against the Zionist enemy, although we had not ignored the Palestinian element in the Palestinian slogan or the Palestinian program in our activity. This matter began gradually to develop in our exhaustion and our practice and passed through numerous stages, the most prominent of which was the formation of a Palestine branch in the nationalists' movements, arriving at and ending with the declaration of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the end of 1967, since I can say that we put our hand on the proper treatment of this problem.

The Second Stage.

This is the stage we begin with the end of the year of the defeat, and it continues to today. It is the stage in which we have worked through the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and in which we have relied on the need to preserve, maintain and crystallize in the general Arab national framework the special Palestinian quality. I can say that with our entry into this stage we have arrived at the proper treatment of this touchy issue, in spite of everything that could be said about errors that accompanied the journey here and there.

In brief, we can point out that the treatment of this matter has brought to the fore two erroneous stands in looking at this issue which were formed in various historic stages and still are coexisting and fighting with one another to the present moment. I have previously stated this matter in a previous press interview, and therefore I find myself returning to it on this occasion.

The First Stand

This is the one that wants to make the domestic yield to the national, whether that is done under the slogan "unity is the road to Palestine" or other slogans. This stand dominated the Arab liberation movement in the period extending from the fifties to the mid-sixties, and its appearance was accompanied by the emergence of the Arab national bourgeoisie and its struggle for the sake of the independence of nations. This period was also distinguished by the nearly total absence of a special distinctive Palestinian national role. Our people were subjected to attempts at effacement and extermination and the appropriation of identity at the hands of the Zionist enemy, the Jordanian regime and other Arab regimes.

The Second Stand

This is the Palestinian regional stand which adopted the slogan "Oh us alone" as its means for marketing the mentality of separation from the Arab national dimension and catching up to the caravan of Arab regionalisms which was descending with dangerous, destructive acceleration. This stand is the one which basically arose as a reaction to the effacement, extermination and appropriation of identity and derived its impetus from its combative dimension, since "Palestinian" had become an indictment in many Arab countries, not to say that it was a combative affiliation for which its adherents paid an exorbitant price under the fire of the occupation and the tyranny of its iron grip.

Palestinian regionalism is nourished by the Arab situation which is pushing in the direction of regionalism, factionalism and loathsome sectarianism, and it is also nourished by the desperate situation which the fraudulent national address ended with, of which nothing has remained but its enmity to Palestinian nationalism and its effort to eliminate and appropriate it.

We cannot accept either of these two stands. They have been tested over the past 40 years and it has become apparent that without the proper realization of the national and domestic dialectic, and without the attainment of a scientific resolution of this equation, many problems will result from that.

As we are thinking about the battle of liberation and national independence, we can only make a reckoning of a group of constants in this context, the most important of which are:

First, Palestinian nationalism, and the need for the assumption of a special Palestinian concrete form, the Palestinian entity, which the Liberation Organization currently embodies. This alone will keep our cause in its proper place as the cause of a people, self-determination and legitimate national rights, not a cause of borders and refugees.

Therefore, the concern over the Palestinian personality, the Palestinian identity and the preservation of it from effacement and appropriation is a process of combative confrontation of the Zionist personality, if we may call it that. It is the opposite of this personality and the alternative to it on Palestinian territory. It is a weapon in confrontation with Judaization on the one hand and Jordanization and annexation on the other.

It goes without saying that affirmation of the Palestinian personality, in this sense, is not a contradiction of the Arab national personality and not a contradiction of the national dimension of the cause, but rather supplements and complements this dimension.

Second, the national dimension of the Palestine cause, since, without a Palestinian movement that interacts and is in harmony with its national environment, it is not possible seriously and responsibly to think of the national liberation struggle or of preserving the gains of the people and the revolution.

We are not saying this under the inspiration of the national connection to the Palestine national cause alone, but are also proceeding from the particular nature of the Palestine cause, the Palestinian diaspora, the bases of support and their importance, the national nature of the struggle against the Zionist enemy, the shift of the Israeli element to an internal element as regards the struggles of many peoples of our Arab nation, and other considerations which prompt us to accept the firm connection between the domestic struggle and the national one.

Of course, as we are now talking in general terms, for considerations of dimension and narrowness of space, we nonetheless realize that the issue of domestic and national dialectic has too many ramifications to be raised in this concise manner.

Third, attention to Palestinian nationalism and the specific Palestinian nature must not drive us to regionalism, whose most harmful and dangerous expression is chauvinism, and our attention to the national dimension of the struggle must not drive us to succumb to the problem of the dissolution and extermination of the Palestinian entity, even if the national movement assumes the Nasserist model or the progressive model, without ambiguity or controversy.

Fourth, the importance of the proper resolution of the domestic and national equation leads us to examine the revolution's connection with the Arab masses and its relationship with the Arab regimes, since a mentality has prevailed, in dealing with the Arab situation, which is focussed on the relationship with Arab regimes and not with the masses, the relationship with which has become governed by temporary tactical considerations most of the time.

Therefore, the rectification of the organization's relationship with the Arab situation must begin with the rectification of the relationship with the Arab masses, making it the focal point on which Palestinian-Arab relations are founded.

Fifth, the Palestinian national movement, in its capacity as a basic part of the camp of liberation, peace and progress in the world, can only be aligned with the progressive camp in the Arab context.

In terms of regimes, organizations and forces, this alignment must be decided in accordance with the nature of the Palestinian revolution and its place in the struggle underway in the domestic, national and international contexts, and the perverse practices of some Arab forces of progressivism must in no way be taken as a means for eliminating the differences among forces and regimes, some of which are nationalist and progressive and others of which are reactionary and function as foreign agents.

The most important question is whether mixing the two camps is permissible, whether the progressives are equal in practice with the reactionaries in their position regarding the Palestine cause, and whether, consequent to that, it is permissible for us to maintain the same level of relations between these two parties.

Sixth, our alignment with the progressive camp in the Arab context does not prevent and is not in conflict with the establishment of more extensive Palestinian-Arab relations including those with what are called conservative Arab regimes that are not directly implicated in conspiracies against the Palestinian people and their national cause and armed revolution.

If we take all these constants into consideration, the view regarding the dialectic of Palestinian-Arab relations may be summarized in the preservation of the special Palestinian national nature, in the context of the firm dialectical connection with the general Arab nationalist nature and the alignment with the Arab progressive camp represented essentially by the masses of the Arab nation without introversion but indeed with openness to all Arab regimes except those directly implicated in conspiracies to liquidate the Palestine cause.

This view proceeds from the rejection of introverted Palestinian regionalism, which takes the absurdity of the Arab situation as a pretext for disseminating despair and frustration, and it rejects regionalism, factionalism and sectarianism, in their function as the expression of the state of weakness and fragmentation which the current Arab situation is experiencing. It also rejects the fraudulent Arab address which takes the slogans of Arab nationalism as a pretext for its inability on the one hand and its continuous effort to expropriate the independent Palestinian national role on the other.

Decisive salvation, here, is summarized in the following words: it is not possible for the domestic element to be absent under any circumstances and it is not possible for this element to be divorced from its essential national dimension.

The Second of These Lessons: The Internationalist Element in the Struggle:

As we pause to contemplate the experience of the 40 years since the establishment of the Zionist enemy, we can only observe the great effect international public opinion and the international community played in the establishment, preservation and support of this entity over a number of years.

Thus, had it not been for the international consensus burdened with the shadow of Nazism and its loathesome specter, and had it not been for the "erroneous illusions" which seeped into some friendly and allied circles during this period concerning the truth of the Zionist plan in Palestine, what happened would not have happened, and perhaps the whole history of the region would have assumed a different form.

Today, in the context of the heightened intensity of the interconnection among the regional and international links in the struggle, when the whole world seems a single stage, the struggle to win over public opinion and the international community seems more important than at any time in the past, and along with that any belittlement or manipulation of the value of the internationalist links seems a sort of childish conspiracy inflicting the most flagrant harm on the course of our struggle in the domestic and national arenas.

The collapse of Israel's image in the eyes of world public opinion and its appearance in its true form, as one of the most intransigent of the reactionary forces helping to threaten world peace and stability, one which is considered part of the vanguard of the imperialist-reactionary onslaught, which is working to suppress the development of the revolutionary liberationist movement of the world—the emergence of Israel in this form is the first, essential prelude to our success in the struggle of the total restoration of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights.

As we have pointed out at an early point, the past 40 years have unmasked Israel's reactionary, fascist racist essence, and we have only to wage our struggle wisely and perceptibly to win over growing contingents of sympathizers and people supporting our legitimate struggle.

Israel is linked in a strategic alliance with American imperialism and plays the role of the nourisher and supporter of the counterrevolution in Africa and Latin America. Along with the society of the industry of war in America, it is embarking on the adventure of Star Wars,

now that it has come into possession of the atomic bomb and the delivery system for it, the Ariha-2 missile, which has come to threaten the southern Soviet Union.

Placing hopes on our success in winning this struggle is a tangible expectation and it has a realistic chance for success. We have covered great strides along this road, especially with the outbreak of the people's uprising in the occupied territories, which has revealed the racist-fascist essence of this entity to the world.

However, for success in winning this struggle, there are conditions which must be provided, the most important of which are two:

First, maintaining the force of impetus of Palestinian national action within this struggle's escalating trend. No matter what the world's understanding of our cause and tragedy might come to, it does not respect the weak and the force of logic is not an alternative in any way to the logic of force. Above and beyond that, the accuracy and clarity of the Palestinian revolution's political policy plays a decisive role in this realm.

Second, approaching the position of the international community, without neglect, and alienating oneself as much as possible from frenzied positions which have the effect of broadening the gap between the special national position and the position on the internationalist front.

Concurrence with the international community's position is a necessity, especially since the international community today seems to have better understanding of the justice of our national cause, and has expressed this in a group of resolutions and positions which international bodies and organizations and various regional and international blocs, from socialist and nonaligned countries to the Organization of African Unity and the Islamic Conference, have adopted.

How can we reach concurrence with the international community? How at the same time can we preserve the essence of our demands and goals and not be categorized by neglect of our rights, in full and unblemished? Is there a means for resolving this apparent contradiction between our acceptance of the international will and its resolutions, and our adherence to our ultimate slogans?

Concerning these questions and conjectures, we will try to answer as much as this article will allow.

First of all:

How can we be in concurrence with the international will, with the major orientation of international public opinion, and not seem isolated from the movement of the world and its influential forces?

The starting point in answering this question is embodied in the need to formulate a tentative political program which lies within the scope of the historically possible

and has the acceptance, sympathy and support of the majority in the international community, because settling for the repetition of general ultimate slogans, which might not be understood by a number of international circles, will have the effect of depriving us of the ability to mobilize and draw up the broadest segments of international public opinion in our struggle against the enemies' front.

Therefore, the Palestine Liberation Organization's tentative program has been the program of return, self-determination and construction of the independent nation. Therefore our advocacy of the program and our embrace of it and defense of it as a program of Palestinian national consensus and a program which enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority in the international community has come about.

It need not be asserted that the Palestinian people's success in regaining their legitimate rights to return to their country and build their independent country will in reality pave more than half the way to the elimination of the Zionist-imperialist plan in our country and realization of the ultimate goals of our people and our motherland.

It might be said, for example, as one objects to the notion of tentativeness in the Palestinian struggle, that reaching any tentative solution will obstruct the strategic resolution of the Palestine question. This is something we will talk about in the course of answering the second question.

Secondly: How can one be in concurrence with the will of the international community without ignoring or exhausting all our people's national rights to their nation, and what is the way to resolve this conflict and contradiction?

Placing hopes on the resolution of this anomaly is based on certain confidence that the truth about this "rapacious cancerous beast" will be laid bare before the broadest circles of international public opinion, which in 1948 had imagined that it had planted a "meek lamb" in our ranks and an "oasis of democracy" in the desert of repression and Arab barbarism.

In this we are not exaggerating or proceeding from hypothetical illusions, since the world is gradually approaching a realization of the true nature of this entity.

Israeli strategy is founded on an "understanding of the enemy" which includes the people against whom it has committed and will commit aggression, not to mention their allies in being and in prospect for religious, national and political reasons. The danger on the basis of this strategy lies not just in the enemy's actual resources but in likelihoods and possibilities that have not been

exploited as well. Aggression has the goal of striking not just at the danger that exists and has assumed concrete form, but also at the probable one.

In the light of this "understanding of the enemy," the "notion of power" is determined, embracing its substance, policy and components so that military power will be the product of comprehensive economic, human, social and scientific power.

Guided by this strategy, the memorandum of strategic understanding was signed by Israel and American imperialism. This was subjected to development and "deepening," so that the Zionist entity came to occupy an equal position of membership in the NATO alliance and the imperialist alliance system.

Regardless of the details of this memorandum and the appendices and annexes which followed it, making Israel the spearhead in the counteroffensive against the forces of peace, progress and socialism in the world, the essence of the equation which has come to govern the Zionist center within the imperialist center may be summarized as "Israel in the service of the imperialist plan in the context of existence," while world imperialism stands in the service of the Zionist plan's regional objectives.

This equation has been given concrete form many times and on many odious occasions. Israel has offered more than one service to world imperialism, especially in the vile areas where for numerous reasons it is not possible for the United States to perform a direct role; Israel comes to assume this role by proxy for the head of the imperialist camp.

In exchange for this, Washington, throughout the years of the Arab-Israeli struggle, has proved that it is placing all resources and capabilities available to the imperialist camp at the disposal of Israel and its "major regional" plans.

It is the relationship which rises above the level of the hireling-instrument to that of the partner-instrument in the network of interests making up the enemy camp.

In the light of this higher Israeli strategic vision, and because of the nature of the relationship between the Zionist center and the imperialist center, it is then natural to say that the connection between the Palestinian people's success in wresting their ultimate goals from the clutches of the Zionist beast and the success of all the forces of peace, progress, liberation and socialism in inflicting defeat on the imperialist center has become firm and strong. The struggle against these two reactionary centers is now a single one; although its theaters and weapons differ, the forces taking part in it are the same.

Of course the tentative approach is not the only one we can resort to politically to win the battle of world public opinion. The severe struggle that is going on today over the issue of the holding of an international conference

for peace in the Middle East is also a struggle, and a ferocious one, between the camps of the revolution and the counterrevolution on the various regional and international levels.

The international conference we are calling for is a field for the struggle of wills and a means for forming the broadest scope of international public opinion against Zionist stubbornness and arrogance.

It has become clear today that Israel and the United States are almost the [only] two countries which reject the holding of a plenipotentiary international conference under the oversight of the United Nations, with the attendance of the five permanent members of the international Security Council and the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing. The Palestinian position in support of and calling for the holding of this conference has had a great effect in putting the ball in the Israeli court, since the trend in international pressure has come to shift from the Palestinian-Arab context to the Israeli one.

As is well known, a frenzied policy concerning the international conference has had the effect of imposing an atmosphere of isolation and suffocation on Palestinian national action, since how is it possible to imagine the Palestinian situation on the international stage without the support and backing of the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist system and other friendly and allied countries? Indeed, how can one imagine the Palestinian situation in the context of a serious violation in positions with the allies of the revolution in the international framework?

The serious, comprehensive confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance is not possible without the concurrence of the foundations of the Palestinian-Arab-internationalist confrontation camp. This concurrence must be realized in accordance with a specific political program with clear, specific goals. This program, as experience has shown, must be included in the "context of the historically possible." As experience has also shown, the program of return, self-determination and the building of the independent nation is that "historical possibility" in the foreseeable future, and perhaps the international conference, as we have stated the conditions for it, is the appropriate mechanism for giving concrete form to this program and advancing it into the realm of execution.

Through this vision, we can face the Israeli link with the Palestinian link, we can face the Zionist link with the nationalist link and we can face imperialism with the internationalist link, all in a context of comprehensive, unrelenting, perseverant confrontation until the attainment of total freedom and independence.

As to the shift from the arena of tentative slogans to the arena of strategic, ultimate slogans, that is contingent on our ability to place this process also in the framework of

the "historically possible" and not in the context of propaganda and proselytization. The starting point in our effort might proceed from the effort to persuade our allies that the enemy we are facing is not just a threat to the Palestinian people or the Arab nation but is also a threat to the peace and stability of the world—a danger threatening all forces of liberation, peace, progress and socialism.

If Israel and Zionism, by performing the role of counter-revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America, seeking to sabotage the socialist countries by enlisting actively in the plans of Washington and the Western circles in this area, and attempting to reintroduce the "Jewish question" into the agenda of the socialist countries by raising the issue of the emigration of the Jews and pursuing the most extensive campaigns of counterpropaganda and provocation against socialism—if Israel has been doing all that, it without a doubt has been offering us the objective basis for success in this task of ours, and we need only make proper use of this objective circumstance through a cogent policy which does not remove the "strategy" from the calculations of the current, tentative tactics and does not shrink from the Palestinian people's ultimate goals.

The Third of These Lessons: The Dialectic Between the Inner and Outer World:

This issue stood out clearly in the wake of the 1967 war, since the rest of the Palestinian territory was subjected to the fire of Zionist occupation and close to half the Palestinian people in the areas of the 1948 occupation or the areas of the 1967 occupation came to be subject to occupation.

Before 1967, the Palestinian status in the outside world had not yet crystallized in a clear, decisive manner. Palestinian action had just taken its initial steps. As to the inner world, the combative role of the "Palestinians of 1948" had not yet crystallized in the manner which these regions are now witnessing, and, since that date, a broad controversy has been going on concerning the nature of the relationship between the inner and outer world. Perhaps on many occasions one of the two sides of the equation has been made to prevail over the other, in particular the outer world over the inner one.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was in the forefront of the current which advocated that the Palestine revolution have two basic buttresses, neither of which can eliminate the other or do without it.

The first buttress:

This is the most important one within occupied Palestine, since every day half our people there are waging fierce battles of confrontation with plans of political liquidation, attempts to efface our people's identity, conspiracies of Judaization and settlement, the plan of functional partition and the conspiracy of appointments

and attempts to create a reactionary alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization—that is, in brief, with the policies of occupation and its repeated attempts to liquidate our people's national cause by direct means of violence or through joint political plans with the Jordanian regime.

The second buttress: This took form in the main body of the revolution, with its leadership and media institutions and its military, political and social agencies, which after Jordan moved to Lebanon following the massacres of Amman and Jarash of 1970-71, and today has been facing further problems arising from the dispersion which followed the 1982 war.

The revolution's second basic buttress over the past 20 years or more has been exposed to various multi-faceted attempts to uproot and liquidate it, and our people have paid a price of thousands of martyrs for their adherence to this buttress in the battles against the Zionist enemy or in the battles against the Arab bodies which have made various attempts to liquidate the Palestinian fighting force.

Throughout the years which made up the life of the modern Palestinian revolution, the dialectic relationship between the two centers was implanted and strengthened, one of them was affected by the other negatively and positively and affected it, in a rising or falling manner, and one worked to fill any relative vacuum arising from a temporary weakness afflicting the other until it was possible for it once again to rise up, so that our people on the inside and outside could continue their struggle in unity in all their areas under the same banners and for the sake of the same goals, and in the context of the same leadership and entity, the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is true that sometimes we see that "the inner world has monopolized" our people's fighting image through a broad uprising or a great people's upsurge, and it is also true that at other times we see that the "outer world" has monopolized this image in the course of the escalation of the armed Palestinian struggle through the borders or in the course of the heightened severity of foreign aggression and the armed people's confrontation of it, as happened in the war of the invasion and the siege of Beirut in 1982, but it is also true that we at all times have been concerned with this profound dialectical interaction, this profound interconnection between the inner and outer worlds—how not, as we are a single people with a single cause and a single leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization?

The interactions of this interconnection have not been confined to domestic Palestinian considerations. The enemies, also, by virtue of their perception of this interconnection, launched invasions in an organized, coordinated manner against the inner and outer worlds together, and everytime the Palestinian revolution outside the occupied territories was exposed to war or aggression, the eye was on the occupied territory, the field which was to be a point of passage for the second instalment of the Camp David agreements.

Every time the occupied territories were exposed to the iron grip and assaults of tyranny and terror, the enemies' eyes were fixed on striking at the influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization abroad and clipping its wings in its capacity as the most conspicuous obstacle to the American solution, the one returning our people's cause to its proper place as a cause of national liberation, independence and self-determination.

This then is the dialectic of the inner and outer world, which the experience of the years has affirmed and whose effect moments of upsurge here or decline there have not reduced.

What is not to be doubted is that in some of the stages the Palestinian struggle has gone through, the outer world has been made to prevail over the inner one, especially in the years of the broad, distinctive open presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon before 1982. Indeed, we can acknowledge, and it is our duty to acknowledge, that the first buttress, the inner world, on many occasions, did not receive adequate attention from the forces of the Palestine revolution.

We cannot belittle the seriousness of this error, while it had its well known circumstances and causes, or accept its continuation or repetition.

Since no matter what the importance of the second buttress of the Palestine revolution might amount to, the occupied territory remains the main arena on which the struggle is decided, in interconnection and interlinkage with the outer world and with the Arab and international links as well.

On these blessed days, when our people's heroic uprising is flaring up and entering its fourth month, voices arise inside our ranks and outside them belittling the status of the second buttress of the revolution, since the people who hold these views are displaying views and positions which belittle the status of Palestinian national action on the outside, indeed, consider it secondary.

Such opinions were previously expressed in 1982, especially after the outbreak of the wars of the camps in Lebanon, when some people reached an erroneous, wrongful deduction of which the gist was that the second buttress had reached a dead end and that we faced no option but to content ourselves with action inside the occupied territories.

If we eliminate the "evil intentions aimed at liquidation" which lie behind some of these claims, and if we assume good will, we will say that we are faced with an erroneous, dangerous point of view. It is not in the power of the inner world, which is considered a basic, decisive buttress, to manage to wrest our people's legitimate national rights in full apart from the struggle of the outer world, without a deeper, firmer connection with the struggle of the masses and their national forces on the

Arab stage, and without a firm alliance with the struggle of the movement of peace, progress, liberation and socialism throughout the international stage.

The essence we come up with after this intensified review of the dialectic of the relationship between the inner and outer worlds is that the Palestine revolution, which was founded since the dawn of its first takeoff on two basic buttresses, is today passing and continuing thanks to the interaction of these two buttresses, and if we give decisive priority to the first buttress, within the occupied territories, we cannot under any circumstances eliminate or belittle the importance of the revolution's second basic buttress on the outside.

Following this summary, we must, as we are talking about the inner and outer world, distinguish between the characteristics of one given Palestinian community and another and observe the distinctive role which one given community and another can play in the course of our people's long struggle.

When we talk about the inner world, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip occupied since 1967 immediately come to mind. However, the areas occupied in 1948 generally are passed over.

This view is also erroneous. The portion of our people and territory that was subjected to Zionist occupation in 1948 is an integral part of the Palestinian people and territory and the effort must be made by every means to stimulate its role and increase its participation in the heroic conflict of the struggle which our people are waging against their enemies, and we must make this role progress beyond the level of support and active solidarity to the level of actual participation. We must move the spark of the uprising over to Galilee, the Triangle, Nazareth, the Negev and every occupied city and village in Palestine, all of Palestine.

This may have been what caused the Zionist enemy the most anxiety, since his senior commanders have expressed their fears of the "change in conditions" in these areas and the invasion by the flame of the uprising of what they called the "green belt," its conflagration, and with it the conflagration of all attempts to "domesticate" our people. This weapon, the weapon of our masses in the areas occupied in 1948, has not been used yet in full form, and we must think seriously about how to use this weapon in the best manner.

With respect to the outer world, in spite of the importance of the Palestinian communities in the various areas of the diaspora, especially in Lebanon, the Palestinian community in Jordan has exceptional importance to which we must pay attention and give note, because of the extent to which it will be affected in the event of our success in stimulating this vital portion of our people.

There are numerous reasons for this, among them:

The magnitude and relative weight of this community on the Jordanian stage, since it constitutes the majority of the population.

The special nature of the relationship between the masses of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, who are unified by a single cause, a single battleground, a single destiny, a single goal, and indeed a single national movement.

The special nature of the role the Jordanian regime has played and is still playing to implant the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary schemes through which it aims at liquidating our people's cause under numerous names and labels.

The geographic consideration, the existing state of contact between the two banks of the Jordan River, and this country's maintenance of the longest borders with the Israeli enemy.

For all these considerations, and others, the Palestinian community in Jordan possesses special importance in the foreign context and we must devote the adequate, appropriate attention to it.

For all these reasons, our fourth national conference, 1981, was not content to talk about the two buttresses of the revolution and the bases of support abroad, but paused at length to consider the special nature and basic quality of the Jordanian stage.

The Fourth of These Lessons: Armed Struggle and the Various Forms of Combat

The most conspicuous errors and lessons to which the previous experience has given concrete expression may have included the need for creatively combining the various forms of struggle and failing to succumb to the error of making one of them prevail over the other or exchanging one for another.

Our revolution was faced with a time, the years of its first takeoff in particular, when only armed struggle was permitted, to the point where the Liberation Organization's official documents stipulated for many years that armed struggle was the only method of conflict.

With the development of the revolution, our view of this issue matured and crystallized, especially when the revolution managed with tangible success to enter into the political, diplomatic, media and other fields of mass struggle.

This of course does not mean belittling the status of armed struggle or pushing it to the second rank. Armed struggle was, still is and will remain the main form of conflict. It was, still is and will remain the crane by

which all the important political achievements our people realized have been raised, the crane by means of which our cause, our revolution and the Liberation Organization have reached the position and status they occupy today in the Palestinian, Arab and international contexts.

However, the thing which must be stressed is that armed struggle alone, without connection to political, diplomatic, media and mass action, will remain deficient in realizing the goals and achievements our people aspire to and for whose sake they are making immense sacrifices.

Our struggle with the Zionist enemy is a comprehensive struggle in every sense of the word. The enemy is fighting us with weapons, politics, diplomacy, money, economy and the media, and is waging the struggle of history, heritage and culture against us. Therefore we must ourselves, in turn, face him in these various fields.

We must be good at managing our political and diplomatic struggles and continue our efforts to isolate this entity internationally and show it as it really is. We must mobilize all our forces to strip him of the supremacy of the Western media machine, succeed in acquiring the support of the broadest segments of world public opinion, and use the weapon of the media in this struggle. We must wage a struggle with him on the economic front, pursue or strike at his interests and deprive him of any opportunity for benefitting from them in developing his economic and social structure. We must reveal his attempts to assail our history, our culture, our heritage and our women's clothing.

We must, and this is most important, give every Palestinian a role in this struggle on the occupied territory, in the encircling countries and in the Arab countries in remote areas of emigration. We must turn our combative instrument into an integrated "symphony," with each member of our people having his specific role in it.

Above and beyond this, prime responsibility for the mobilization of all fraternal, friendly and allied forces on the Arab and international stages so that we may strike at "Israel's" alliance and its firm connection to Zionism and world imperialism lies on us in the revolution.

The experiences of the victorious peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America have taught us to resort to arms, to armed struggle, to struggle with the enemies, but these same experiences teach us at the same time the importance of resorting to various means of struggle and not belittling the status of any of them in any way.

How great is our need, as we face an enemy who wants absolutely to "eliminate our existence," efface our identity, exterminate our culture, falsify our history and divert the world's attention from our legitimate rights, how great is our need, in the context of this particular situation, to learn to wage the struggle on all fronts and fields with the various weapons—the rifle, the book, the painting, the poem, ordinary dress, the media, diplomacy and so forth.

How great is our need, as well, as we are facing a fascist racist enemy packed with weapons from his head to the tips of his toes, to adhere to the option of armed struggle as a major, decisive option.

The Fifth of These Lessons: The Failure To Place the Strategy of the People's War in Confrontation With Other Strategies:

The errors and lessons which one must pause to contemplate as we are intending to talk about the ill-starred 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Zionist entity is the failure to place the strategy of long-range people's war in contradiction and confrontation with the strategy of classic military wars.

In our ranks, for many years, views and viewpoints prevailed which talked about the strategy of long-range people's war in its function as the sole appropriate strategy for confronting the Zionist imperialist enemy. The strategy of classic military war was considered a "discarded" one, one not suitable for facing the camp of the enemies.

The reasons which lie behind the emergence of this view, which still preserves a following within the Palestinian ranks, may be attributed to:

Some victorious experiences through which small peoples realized decisive victories over the reactionary-imperialist enemy which was superior to them in weapons of destruction and annihilation and his possession of technology and giant resources.

The complicity of some Arab regimes and their failure to play their desired role in the struggle for the sake of regaining Palestinian and Arab rights.

The adoption by these regimes of the enemy's superiority as an excuse for distancing themselves from waging the decisive confrontation with the Zionist enemy, indeed, their constant effort to prevent the Palestinian people from being able to pursue their long-range war against the Zionist enemy under the pretext of preparation for "all-out war" with the enemy, or on the pretext of avoiding involvement in a war for which they have not made preparation.

Therefore, it was not out of the question that some views should come to prominence in our circles which would place the two strategies in contradiction with one another.

We for our part have been, still are and will remain partisans of the strategy of long-term people's war to confront the imperialist-Zionist enemy who is overpowering us with his resources, arms and power to annihilate and destroy, and we have been and still are proponents of the mobilization of the powers of the Palestinian

people and all Arab peoples in this struggle of confrontation to crush the enemy's superiority and proceed firmly toward the attainment of the goals of our people and the peoples of the Arab nation.

However, at the same time we do not consider that the strategy of people's war contradicts the strategy of classic military war. Rather, it may be complementary to it, if goals and political views are unified and the proper foundations and points of emphasis assume concrete form for a clearly-delineated domestic-national Palestinian-Arab national front.

The experience of the October 1973 war may provide proof of that. This war entailed the Arab soldier's recovery of his confidence in himself and the Arab fighting man proved his distinctive ability to master modern weapons, use them competently and enter into struggles, some of which were the most massive battles in modern military history, against the Zionist enemy.

Had it not been for the bad, collusive, deficient management the war was subjected to by al-Sadat, the results would not have been as they are today, not just in the political framework but also in the field framework related to the course of the war itself and the field results it produced, as has become apparent today.

For all this, it is not permissible that the strategy of people's war be placed in confrontation with the strategy of classical war. Rather, need requires that we examine the integration of the two strategies, not their contradiction.

The Sixth of These Lessons: Strategy and Tactics: The Dialectic of the Relationship:

The most prominent lessons experience has brought to the fore also include the dialectic of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Palestinian political action.

It is not enough, for example, for us to determine our strategic and remote goals and it is also not enough for us to draw up a structural plan for the enemy front and the friendly front, since, in spite of the maximum importance of this matter, it alone is not sufficient.

What is required in exchange is the outlining of proper tactical steps that will reach the ultimate goals. What is also required is the observation of all conflicts and contradictions within the enemy's camp so that it will then become possible to use them and benefit from them in our partial and all-out struggles against this enemy.

It is required that an accurate observation of the existing balance of power be made, to know what demands and goals can be seized in each stage and to formulate the tactical slogans which are in keeping with the existing balance of power. It is also required that an accurate study be carried out in order to determine the central

link at each stage in order to avoid falling prey to stumbling about in the debris of the numerous tasks which of course do not occupy the same degree of importance. What is required, finally, is that alliances be drawn up carefully in the light of all these considerations. This is a task that seems basic and without which it will not be possible to progress successfully toward our tentative and ultimate goals.

We are not exaggerating about anything if we say that the official approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization's tentative program toward the end of 1979:

Has played an important role in guiding the course of the Palestinian struggle and drawing up goals for it in the limits of the "historically possible." This program has expressed an advanced level of development in Palestinian consciousness and thinking.

The struggle we are waging today on the front of the international conference will also help enrich our struggle with further allies and friends on the international stage and will help in our success in gaining increasing groups of international public opinion.

These are examples, and there are dozens besides them, which tangibly show the importance of "proficiency in tactics" in our political struggle and the failure to settle for the propounding of general slogans.

In viewing the issue of the dialectic of the relationship between strategy and tactics, two erroneous attitudes have come to prominence on the Palestinian stage:

The first, with a pragmatic coloration, expresses the national bourgeoisie's exasperation with the burdens of the continuation of the struggle and the shaking of its confidence in the ability to wrest our people's rights and ultimate goals.

Therefore, we have observed how the proponents of this viewpoint on many occasions act impatiently and how on other times current, instantaneous tactics override ultimate, long-range strategy.

We have also observed an inclination on these people's part to retreat from the remote goals under the pressure of "the conditions of the present moment" and so forth.

The most dangerous thing that can confront us is for us to forget and ignore our strategic goals in the press of our daily struggle and our exercise of political tactics and consequently to lose the compass necessary to guide our course and illuminate the road before our people.

The second, which is an attitude of a dogmatic coloring, is content with the repetition of great slogans, strategy and "aloofness" from the pursuit of political tactics. It views the enemy's front in a black and white fashion and sees no gradual political colorations between them.

The seriousness of this attitude lies in its tendency to nihilism, secessionism and deviation from realistic political action and in its function of leading those who hold it to the sidelines of political movement, so they lose their ability to act and exert influence.

In exchange for this, we see that the scientific position, as experience has established it, is founded on the following bases:

A. The need to give concrete form to the strategic goals of the people and the revolution and the accurate determination of the enemy and friendly camps.

B. After that comes the role of the political leadership in giving concrete form to and deriving the tentative tasks of national action in the framework of the conditions and balances that exist at a given stage.

C. The proficient linkage of tactics and tentative goals with strategic goals, so that we will then come to be faced with a chain of interconnected links, one of which will lead to the other, and not faced with tactics divorced from and outside the course of strategy.

D. The pursuit of political tactics contains, among other things, a view of the delicate differences among the parties to the enemy camp, but our view of these parties is not for a moment remote from describing them as part of a single camp.

These are some of the most prominent features of the dialectic relationship between tactics and strategy as our experience through the past 40 years has established it.

The enemy has also been able to realize his goals, one after the other, in attaining the position he is in today, and we ourselves must conversely succeed in completing the journey of return to the nation, self-determination and the construction of the independent Palestinian state through constant, unremitting struggle and must not in this journey lose the compass which will show our our entire nation to our rights, to our people's ultimate goals, without introversion or withdrawal, but without excess or heedlessness either.

The Seventh of These Lessons: The Class Issue and the Importance of the Decisive Political Line in Confronting the Enemy:

In our pause to consider the journey of 40 years of continuous struggle against the Zionist enemy who has been implanted on our territory, we must pause before the most prominent way-stations which have accompanied this journey.

In our particular experience, we will stop before the two most prominent lessons the experience of the Arab national movement has yielded up.

The first lesson:

The loss by this experience of the requisite accurate scientific balance in viewing the issue of the "domestic and national dialectic," since we had previously referred to the overruling of the domestic by the national until we reached the year of the defeat, 1967, and seriously and comprehensively reviewed this vision, which is what the experience of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has expressed.

The second lesson:

In this era, the era of the Arab nationalists, we lost the class view, which does not place all classes of the people on an equal footing in the context of the Arab national liberation movement; rather, we can differentiate between the role of one class and another.

Today, with the passage of more than 20 years since the moment of the shift from the framework of the movement to the framework of the front, we are becoming increasingly won over to the importance of these two conclusions.

It is true that we are still in the framework of the national democratic revolution, indeed still are in its first context, national liberation. It is also true that this stage requires getting all classes of the people, including the bourgeoisie, to participate in the revolutionary process. However, it is also true that not every class has the same role in this combative process.

The most trivial reading of the history of the modern Palestinian experience indicates without ambiguity or obscurity that the class leadership of Palestinian national action in the various stages it has gone through has borne the responsibility, if only in a partial manner, for the results we have attained. That was the case in the years 1936-39 and the same thing was repeated in 1948. No one can deny that the current class leadership of the revolution bears part of the responsibility for the results it has attained, negatively or positively.

It has become clear through our review of the lessons and errors that occurred in conjunction with the journey how important and basic the emergence and crystallization of the decisive political line has been in confronting the enemy, in terms of suppressing right-wing orientations and tendencies and resisting the nihilistic adventurist platform.

The revolution and the organization, over more than 2 decades of time, have confronted stages and turning points in which the maximum importance of such a decisive line has become apparent. The experience of the past 5 years and the aggravation of tendencies of heedlessness on the one hand and the emergence of the

platform of adventurism and nihilism that have accompanied them on the other may be the best proof of the vital nature of the role the democratic revolutionary forces have played in this context.

Beyond that, the emergence and growth of the role of the democratic revolutionary current is the basis for the preservation, maintenance and reinforcement of the revolution's overall national line. It is the condition which is indispensable for guaranteeing the advent upon our ultimate goals.

What Then?

Here 40 years have elapsed since the usurpation of Palestine and the implantation of the Zionist entity on our territory by fire and iron, blood and massacres. Forty years have elapsed and with them a record full of the enormous struggles and sacrifices our people and the peoples of our Arab nation have offered.

As we also pointed out, at the start of this article, the enemy has succeeded in realizing a group of strategic goals while the movement of the Palestinian and Arab struggle has remained incapable of realizing such successes.

We have talked about the elements of strength in this entity's possession and have briefly referred to the most conspicuous of these elements. We have also talked about the elements of weakness which have accompanied our journey of struggle and in the two cases we had the goal of refuting prevailing simplistic views, and the other side of the picture, the enemy's weak points and the elements of strength we possess, was not absent from our minds.

Since the space here is not ample enough for a discussion of this side of the picture, we will therefore content ourselves by referring to two basic points:

First, while the Zionist entity grew and developed under the effect of the support and backing of the "Western outer world" and its carefully studied investment of this support and backing on the basis of a clearly-delineated strategic policy, there is no doubt that the "Arab outer world" will be its point of weakness and death.

This entity has been able to "develop" throughout these 4 decades in the context of "relatively comfortable" circumstances. It is true that in the course of them it waged six wars with the Arabs, but they were all, with a limited exception, the October war and the 1982 war, low-cost wars relative to the magnitude of the accomplishments they realized.

Since this was the case, it was able to take decisive strides along the road to building its developed socioeconomic structure and move to the ranks of the "major regional nation."

The point in the countdown in this entity's course started when "Israel" found itself in conditions and circumstances which were not suitable for the continuation of its course along this road.

Perhaps it goes without saying that such conditions and circumstances will not be realized spontaneously and under the effect of the movement and development of the intrinsic laws which govern this entity. The situation requires action from "the outer world," a domestic-Palestinian national liberation movement in solidarity with the Arab national liberation movement, which will help thwart Israel's strategic plans and make all its occupation of Palestinian territory very exorbitant, an occupation which cannot be paid for from the "Israeli pocket," as a step along the road to making "Israeli existence" exorbitant in cost, one whose price cannot be paid for from the "imperialist pocket."

The points of strength the enemy possesses are the same points which we can convert into points of weakness and death. The enemy, through his aggressive, racist policy, is working to dig his grave and while he tries to exterminate the Palestinian people and eradicate their identity, while he is playing the role of imperialist policeman in the region, and while he is trying to play the role of the spearhead against the camp of peace, liberation, progress and socialism in the world, he is thus marshalling the powers of the Palestinian people, who reject extermination and adhere to their rights, and marshalling the powers of the Arab nation, whose development this entity is working to suppress. He is also marshalling the powers of the forces of peace and progress in the world.

He is thus indeed digging his grave and proving tangibly that he is proceeding against the direction of history.

This of course requires a Palestinian-Arab-internationalist act which is different from what exists at present, and this moves us on to talk about the second point.

The second point:

The need to give concrete form to a higher strategy for a Palestinian-Arab-internationalist confrontation which will guarantee the employment of the powers of the whole Palestinian people, domestically, in Jordan and in the diaspora, in the various political, military, diplomatic, economic, media and cultural fields and levels, alongside the powers of our Arab nation and its national and liberation forces, and in the framework of a firm strategic alliance with the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism in the world.

The development of the features of such a strategy must proceed from a deeper, more accurate understanding of the Zionist entity, and must proceed from a comprehensive scientific review of the course of our struggle over the past 40 years.

While we have talked about some of the most conspicuous lessons and mistakes which have accompanied our past experience, but not all of them, and have not addressed ourselves to features of the strategy of comprehensive confrontation with the enemy, that is because

we consider that the basic features of such a strategy are contained in the front's literature and the documents of its successive conferences, especially the fourth national conference.

This article is only an attempt in the direction of enriching this strategy and giving it concrete form, or, more precisely, calling for a profound, comprehensive dialogue among the various approaches of Palestinian-Arab democratic national action with the goal of arriving at such a common strategy. 11887

EGYPT

Ibrahim Shukri Discusses Labor Party's Actions Regarding Emergency Law

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[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, parliamentary opposition leader, by Usamah 'Ajaj; in Cairo, date not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] The opposition's reaction, that of the Labor Party in particular, to the extension of the emergency law was expected to be in keeping with measures the opposition had threatened to adopt. Why was it confined only to denunciation and opposition in the People's Assembly?

[Answer] As far as we in the Labor Party are concerned, we have always advocated the need to repeal the emergency law. I believe that not a single meeting held by opposition parties passed without us drawing attention to this issue. And the dialogue between the opposition parties and the ruling party notwithstanding, I pointed out during the dialogue that we planned to do everything we could to caution the people against the perils of extending this law. The only meeting that preceded the unexpected emergency law submission was held at the Labor Party's office on 17 March and attended by all the national forces. Our aim was to proclaim the people's wish, as represented by their national movements and parties, to repeal the emergency law. We denounced the extension in the People's Assembly.

[Question] Has the notion of withdrawing from or freezing the opposition's membership in the People's Assembly been dropped?

[Answer] Actually, following the decision to extend the law, the Labor Party's supreme committee was of the opinion that a firm stand should be taken. It proposed that membership in the People's Assembly be frozen until the end of the current session. Meanwhile, there was a call for a unified stance among the entire opposition, on the assumption that this unified position may in time have a greater impact than a separate Labor Party stance, hence the withdrawal of the entire opposition, without distinction between the Labor and the Wafd parliamentary bodies. I announced my objection and we

walked out of the assembly session in the name of the entire opposition. It was truly a good sign, especially since not a single opposition member remained behind.

[Question] But how true are the allegations that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, the Labor Party members in the alliance, blocked the party's withdrawal from the People's Assembly?

[Answer] When the matter was discussed at the parliamentary body before we joined the assembly session in which the emergency law was debated, I personally proposed that I withdraw or resign from parliament in protest without giving the government the opportunity to squander the opposition seats by holding elections subject to all possibilities. Everyone, from the Labor Party to the Muslim Brotherhood to the Liberal Party, turned down my offer. This clearly proves that allegations that the Muslim Brotherhood was against withdrawal are false, since the matter was simply brought up for discussion but was dropped.

[Question] Why was the notion of withdrawing from the People's Assembly turned down?

[Answer] Because withdrawal gives the ruling party a golden opportunity which the government can exploit in getting a large number of laws passed. We witnessed one example of that when the law permitting real estate ownership by foreigners and Arabs was taken up and the speaker, along with the National Party majority, ruled that this law be considered in the same session without giving us the chance to familiarize ourselves with its scope and effects. As you see, we are thus compelled to keep our eyes on all government submissions. It is noteworthy that during the session when the opposition walked out—and this was known ahead of time—19 questions and queries by the members of the alliance were quashed, as was an inquiry submitted to the interior minister, because the questioners were not present, especially since it had been decided in the session to set a date for discussion of the questions and the inquiry but not for the debate itself. However, the minister of the interior dramatically announced his readiness to debate the inquiry on the spot. I believe that resignation by opposition members would not have had the kind of impact some people believe it would, since by-elections could be held. We are up against a party and a government that heed neither principles nor logic nor the constitution.

[Question] What about the local council elections which the opposition parties were planning to boycott as a protest against the extension of the emergency law?

[Answer] Local councils have their own special situation. They have a broad base of 25,000 members scattered all over Egyptian villages, hence their patent importance in terms of these councils representing people's interests as well as the people being represented in them. I believe this alone is enough to compel us not to boycott these

elections. We in the Labor Party have decided to join these elections, even on the basis of an absolute slate. We have also decided to have the widest possible coordination between the various opposition factions in a serious attempt to establish a presence in local councils which used to be formed by appointment or by an absolute slate electoral system. Elections have not been held for 9 years.

[Question] How do you perceive coordination among opposition factions in local council elections?

[Answer] A great opportunity exists for coordination and the opposition slate does not have to be under any particular party name, but can indeed be diverse according to the parties' weight and popularity in the various districts. Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi issued a statement to the effect that local council elections would follow the individual system, meaning the reinstitution of the pre-slate system, thus opening the door for coordination among parties whereby unnamed slates would be submitted and approved elements would be selected from parties. We are awaiting the bill's submission to the People's Assembly and hope that we will have ample guarantees for free elections and non-intervention by local administrative agencies.

[Question] If withdrawal from parliament is futile, what is the proper way to handle the conflict over the emergency law?

[Answer] The solution is to continue going to the people, to unite efforts to explain the people's rejection of the emergency law, and to seek a united stand through coordination between the parties and the professional and labor unions. I believe that any kind of action among the people and within the scope of parties and unions and any endeavor to reach a consensus will be backed by opposition action within the People's Assembly that will have a greater impact than withdrawal.

[Question] Don't you think that a clear and sharp contradiction exists between the Labor Party's stance of being the sole supporters of President Mubarak's renomination for another term, and then holding him responsible for the enactment of the emergency law?

[Answer] I do not think there is any contradiction. Simply put, our approval of the National Party proposal to renominate President Mubarak places a greater responsibility on us than on those who abstained, like the Wafd, or those who turned it down, like the NPUG. Furthermore, our agreement to renominate Mubarak falls within the framework of our insistence on certain demands, starting with the repeal of the emergency law. If this is not implemented, our protest will be vehement and our rejection manifest.

[Question] Do you believe that, in the wake of the recent crisis, the national dialogue between the National Party and the opposition parties stands a chance of being resumed?

[Answer] I do not conceive such a possibility unless the government is willing to change its position significantly. The fact that I always advocate the importance of the two sides getting to know each other's points of view notwithstanding, unfortunately it is quite evident that the ruling party is not at all interested in the matter. Hence, I see no benefit in any dialogue unless this attitude is changed and everyone realizes that when we express an opinion we do so from a sincere pan-Arab national premise.

[Question] Now that the alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party as been in effect for a while, can you tell us who has gained and who has lost from this experience?

[Answer] The alliance has been a great experience. It is the only thing that can be discerned by anyone who has been following the party movement in the last 10 years or in 30 years of political life. For the first time, a popular group has been able, through popular will, to establish a presence in spite of all the various constraints restricting party formation and the lack of guarantees for managing the elections, as underscored by the Council of State decisions that the election results of alliance candidates had been rigged. Nonetheless, the alliance forced the government to announce the victory of 64 deputies, and the government knows the true figures better than anyone else. Hence, this alliance has been a great and rich experience of great benefit to the popular movement.

12502

Abazah Details New Power Plants, Conservation Attempts

45040152 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 31 May 88 p 3

[Interview with Minister of Electricity and Energy Mahir Abazah by Muhammad al-Shamma' in Cairo; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] In view of the continuing draught, the continuing increase in demand for power, and the possibility that water level behind the dam will, God forbid, reach 147 meters, in which case the power plant would come to a standstill and we would lose 30 percent of Egypt's total power output—what action have you taken to deal with such a situation?

[Answer] If the water level reaches 147 meters, the dam will stop functioning. But the official communique issued by the minister of irrigation asserts that water level at the end of July will reach 150 meters, which

means that the dam power plant will be operating at half of its capacity, 850 mega-watts, instead of at its full capacity of 1750 megawatts.

[Question] What if the High Dam stops functioning?

The minister lifted a red telephone receiver in order to answer a call regarding consultations to confirm that financing of various projects had been completed. He put the receiver down with a smile because he had just obtained approval of financing projects of his emergency plan.

[Answer] In order to face the power shortage we have set up an emergency plan comprising power plants whose total output of 1,600 megawatts is almost equal to that of the High Dam. These are to be contracted, built, and commissioned within 14 months. The contracting and implementation of the first project in Damietta, a plant with a 720 megawatt capacity, has in fact begun in cooperation with West Germany. A contract has also been concluded for a 330 megawatt plant in southern Cairo in cooperation with the Americans. A contract will be concluded this month with France for the construction of the al-Nubariyah 440 megawatt plant. All these power plants will be operating from the end of March and up to the end of July next year.

Thus we will have completed building a new high dam in about a year, whereas building the High Dam took 8 years.

The ministry is in the process of implementing a second emergency plan regarding which contracts have been concluded. This includes expansion of the Abu Qir plant by adding a 325 megawatt steam-driven unit in cooperation with France. Implementation and commission of this plant will take place in 1990. The 'Ataqah power plant will be expanded by adding a fourth unit with a 325 megawatt output. A contract on this has been concluded with Germany and the unit is expected to go into operation before the end of 1989. The Damanhur plant is also to be expanded by adding a 325 megawatt unit in cooperation with Italy. This will come into operation in 1990. This is in addition to expanding Asyut plant with a 325 megawatt unit in cooperation with Japan, which will come into operation in 1990. Furthermore, Talkha plant will be expanded by adding a 220 megawatt unit in cooperation with Czechoslovakia, which will come into operation at the end of 1990.

[Question] Mr Minister, let us go back to the conservation plan which was drawn up 2 years ago and was approved by the cabinet and to which all the ministers have been committed and which has become obligatory to everybody. What has this plan accomplished and what are the results? Has the government's plan succeeded?

[Answer] I must tell you that (with the exception of the month of Ramadan) there has been a remarkable development in that consumption has dropped by 1 percent of

the total output during the period from December to last May. This is a reasonable rate but we hope to increase conservation, particularly since Egypt is known for its high consumption of everything.

[Question] In the United States, power companies give incentives to consumers in order to reduce their consumption. Why don't we do likewise?

[Answer] But in Egypt we do give such incentives to the consumers even more so than in the United States. This is given in the form of subsidies. We provide the those in the low, medium, and even high brackets of consumption power at a lower rate than cost. This subsidy or incentive is very high for the lower consumption bracket in that the price is only 18 millimes per kilowatt. This represents about 70 percent of the consumers. In fact, the average price per kilowatt for all the consumption brackets is 30 millimes, whereas the average production cost per kilowatt without subsidy is 120 millimes per kilowatt. Are these not subsidies and incentives?

No, of course this is not all that is required. As I have already told you, the 1 percent reduction in consumption is a good indication. But we are suffering from high electric power consumption without reaping any benefits for the government or for the public. The industry consumes 60 percent of the electric power. Therefore, in cooperation with my colleagues in the cabinet and with the help of experts in the specialized councils in the scientific and technological academy (which includes university professors, experts, and officials in the various ministries) we can prepare an executive plan to conserve electric power in the industry and the various companies. I would mention as an example the project to conserve energy in the glass industry. The rate of reduction in energy consumption in this regard was 9 percent. This is achieved by prolonging the life of furnaces and reducing the frequency of overhauling of furnaces. The economic return from this is estimated at 1.6 million Egyptian pounds. There is also the project to conserve energy in the building material manufacturing industry and the food and petroleum industries, as well as to develop furnaces in order to conserve energy. Such projects conserve electric power estimated at millions of pounds.

[Question] Incidentally, we have very often spoken about the question of solar heaters but we can see nothing tangible in this respect. The council of ministers adopted a decision compelling landlords in new cities to install solar heaters. This also applies to hospital and new communities, but none of this has been achieved. [Answer] I would like to tell you that there have in fact been certain problems in this regard but, thank God, we have been able to overcome them. Contracts have been concluded between the new communities and the company which the government has set up for this purpose to

supply solar heaters for the new cities, that is for residential apartments. The installment payments for the solar heater is to be included in the cost of the apartment.

[Question] Did you really prepare a timetable for power cuts in the republic's towns and villages because of power shortages?

[Answer] No, this is absolutely not true, not up to this moment. Let whoever has evidence of this come forward. Cutting off electric power cannot be concealed; it can be seen by all. This is absolutely not true, absolutely not.

[Question] You have requested factories, production companies, water pumping stations, and bakeries to provide diesel power generators to be used in case of power cuts because of the energy crisis.

[Answer] Goodness gracious...this request is not new. Many years ago we planned to have two sources of power for every project so that service can be better and in case of an emergency. This is in order to ensure continuous operation of vital installations; so that no factory, hospital, or bakery will be without power. I would tell you that such auxiliary sources are only for emergencies. In case there is a sudden fault, an auxiliary power source would be available until such time as the main source of power is restored after repairs are done. Therefore, there is nothing new in this, and it is used in all the advanced countries of the world.

[Question] Forgive me, but we are in a difficult year in terms of electric power. What would you do in extreme cases where there is a shortage in power generation or a forced stoppage in some power plants?

[Answer] We will be forced to reduce certain loads for a short period of time during evening peak hours (7 to 9) but we will not touch production units.

13305

ISRAEL

Researcher Describes INF Treaty Implications for Country

44230024 Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew
Mar 88 pp 26-29

[Article by Shmu'el Me'ir: "The INF Treaty and its Implications for Israel"]

[Excerpt] The Reaction in Israel

In contrast to all the talk and excitement that the treaty aroused in the rest of the world, the low profile of official reactions in Israel was striking.

In general, the new treaty got a positive reception in Israel. But from the expressions of decisionmakers—which were sporadic in nature—it could be seen that there were those who were happy with the tangential treatment that the Middle East received in the Reagan-Gorbachev talks, while others regretted the missed opportunity to advance the political process under the auspices of the superpower meeting in Washington. Israeli officialdom made no comment on the possible influence of the INF treaty on the preservation of world stability, on the reduction of tensions, and on increasing trust between East and West.

A country that is “an ally” “like NATO,” might have been expected to react like the Western allies and express clear support for the successful American diplomacy that brought about the agreement.

The Reaction in the Arab World

A look at official media commentary and special announcements like the letter that President Mubarrak sent Reagan and Gorbachev and the announcement of the Syrian Foreign Ministry indicates enthusiastic support by the Arab countries for the INF agreement. They stressed the connections between the superpower agreement in the nuclear realm and the increasing prospect for rapprochement among the superpowers on regional conflicts. In the official commentaries that called for using this momentum to solve urgent regional problems, the writers alluded to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf war, while the PLO was left on the horns of a dilemma.

Particularly noteworthy was the Arab position expressing hope that the agreement would constitute a step toward additional agreements on the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and not just those held by the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Syrian foreign minister added to his words of blessing for the agreement a call for the establishment of nuclear-free areas in the Middle East. Official Syrian commentary found a connection between the INF treaty and world press reports on Israeli testing of the Jericho-2 missile. According to this commentary, Israel is considered an American base outside the framework of the INF treaty, and thus serves as a means for circumventing the prohibition against stationing short and medium-range missiles.

The Political Significance Resulting from the Dynamics of the Agreement

The new agreement has proven once again that the two superpowers, and they alone, lead the world. Indeed, the American Secretary of State, George Shultz, dropped by on his way home to update his counterparts in Brussels, but European interests had already been decided in the talks between Washington and Moscow. The Europe of the Common Market was left far behind. As was the case in past superpower agreements, Middle East leaders will have to take that into account in everything having to do with settling the Arab-Israeli dispute.

More than that, the new fabric of detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. may have a moderating influence on confrontations in other areas of the world, which are of secondary importance from their point of view. In other words, when the U.S.S.R. and the United States can bridge the gap of suspicion between themselves in the strategic arena, they can certainly take on the job of preserving world stability. The inclination to do so will increase as additional agreements are signed on nuclear weapons reductions. What this means is that we can expect rapprochement and dialogue between the superpowers on all aspects of the Israeli-Arab dispute just as on other local questions.

In practical terms we can expect American recognition of the positive role Moscow can play in questions relating to the settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute. This will be quite different from the way things were before the agreement. Still, there is no need to jump the gun and get caught up in the sloganeering about an imposed settlement.

This reading of the possible influence of the new fabric of detente between the U.S.S.R. and the United States on the Israeli-Arab dispute follows from the recognition that it is important to understand the connection between the global-strategic plane and the present situation in the Israeli-Arab dispute. The stress here is on understanding the connection and how important it is for completely deciphering the situation.

A striking example to drive home the importance of understanding the full significance of the connection between the global level (apparently far removed from us) and the immediate reality here, can be found in the detente of the early 1970's, which reached its climax in the SALT-I agreements of 1972 limiting nuclear weapons. It was grasped by one local leader—Sadat—as a kind of seal of approval for the status quo in the post-1967 Middle East.

In Sadat's view, the 1972 detente agreements signalled an agreed-upon freeze of the situation, which therefore led to war and the scrapping of the remaining diplomatic tools that might have broken that political freeze.

The connection between superpower developments on the global level and the Israeli aspect can also be seen in the important topic of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The superpower agreement on weapons dismantling tends to favorably influence the dialogue between the two superpowers on human rights. From this point of view, the tens of thousands of exit visas granted to Jews by the Soviets in the 1970's were an inseparable part of the detente created by the SALT-I agreements.

In summary, it seems that the possible rapprochement between the two superpowers on the question of local conflicts will move itself in the direction of finding common lines of action that will contribute to the reining in and lessening of those conflicts.

In the Military Arena

Israel's strategic situation is directly influenced by relations between the two superpowers, especially in view of the fact that Israel is tied umbilically—from a strategic perspective—to the Middle East basin and to Europe.

The INF treaty therefore shows how a strategic change at the global level has brought about a significant improvement in Israel's national security and a dramatic lessening in the level of the expected threat. This is because of the paragraph in the treaty that requires the elimination of SS-23 missiles, which, according to most assessments, were due to arrive in Syria.

It may be that the Syrians will still get the obsolete and imprecise Scud missiles (with a range of 300 km and therefore not covered under the INF treaty), but they will be hard-pressed to use them to threaten point military targets in depth or to paralyze airfields or take them out of commission.

It must be remembered that, under the terms of the INF treaty, all SS-23 missiles must be removed from the face of the earth, and no new production will be allowed, either of these missiles or any others with a range of 500 km.

Nevertheless it may be that in the future, in order not to violate the treaty, the Soviets will move to develop Scud missiles with improved precision in the range of less than 500 km, and it may be that these new missiles will be transferred to Syria. At this stage, there are no modern precise missiles of this type in the Soviet arsenal, and the process of developing them will take a relatively long time.

An additional operative lesson that follows from the treaty: the elimination of the missiles, especially the SS-12's and the SS-23's, has cancelled the operational need behind the idea of developing a defense system against tactical missiles. Therefore in Western Europe the emphasis has shifted from anti-missile missiles to the development of an expanded air-defense system. It seems clear that there is no point in developing an expensive defense system against imprecise Scud missiles or against short-range SS-21 missiles (70-100 km), which must be brought up to the front where they would be exposed to the other side's artillery fire.

The postponement of the danger posed by the arrival of precise conventional missiles in the Middle East arena, which means the preservation of the strength of Israel's principal interdiction arm—the Air Force—will enable Israel to maintain a versatile theater of operations.

The Significance of the Dynamics Following the Agreement

As we have said, the INF treaty constitutes a transitional stage to further agreements on weapons dismantling, which have possible ramifications for Israel and for the region.

The breakthrough achieved over the last several months in the Geneva negotiations on the prohibition against chemical warfare, especially given the Soviet agreement on inspection of their chemical weapon sites and Moscow's willingness to accept inspection agreements including tours and visits within her territory, allow us to assume that this will be the area of the next superpower agreement rather than in the complex area of ICBM reduction and star wars.

The U.S.S.R. has even called for the signing of an international treaty, subject to inspection, banning chemical weapons, to include all countries that have such weapons. If such a chemical weapons ban were to be achieved, it is reasonable to assume that inspection would be increased to stop the activity of third world nations involved in the development of chemical weapons based on civilian know-how acquired in Western Europe, including Syria, Iraq and Libya.

A further implication of the INF treaty: Although the treaty deals with the dismantling and elimination of American and Soviet missiles, and does not cover the "third side," it must be understood that the Soviet concession on the matter of French and British missiles is temporary. The Soviet Union could retreat from its demands on including the French and British missiles in the INF treaty until the maturation of the relatively small arsenals of these two countries. But in the next stage of discussions, toward the 1990's, Moscow will no longer be able to ignore those missiles.

The French and British modernization programs will bring about a dramatic increase in their nuclear power and will give France and Britain the capability of raining massive destruction on a large number of targets within Soviet territory.

The INF treaty provides a certain precedent for missiles of the "third side." The treaty also requires the dismantling of 72 West German Pershing-1A rockets, the nuclear warheads for which are in American hands. When the question of the "third side" is raised fully in the next round of talks, it may be that the Soviets will also raise the question of "third side" missiles other than those of France and Britain which can reach Soviet territory. Moscow radio commentaries in the summer of 1987 on reports of the testing of the Israeli Jericho-2 missile hinted in this direction. The commentary indicated that wherever there are missiles with a range of hundreds of kilometers that can reach Soviet territory, the level of discussion goes beyond the regional framework and becomes a matter superpower concern. Israel

was even called upon explicitly to join in the nuclear weapons reduction talks in Europe. In terms of the threat assessment by the U.S.S.R. as reflected in that series of commentaries, Israeli Jericho-2 missiles and West German Pershing-1A's are to be treated alike. Here we come round full circle in explaining the connection with the current global-strategic reality.

Israel is not isolated from the rest of the world, and strategic developments at the global level have direct influence on her national security. We have tried to show here the points of contact between Israeli interest and the global scheme of things.

It is up to Israel to derive the maximum from her understanding of this connection.

09794

Mar-Apr Tourism 23 Percent Less Than Jan-Feb Figures

44230032b Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
6 May 88 p 5a

[By Zohar Blumenqrantz and Dan Sagir]

[Text] A summary of data on incoming tourists, after adjustment for seasonal fluctuation, shows a continuing decline in April in the movement of tourists to Israel.

In March-April 1988 the level of incoming tourism was 23 percent less than for January-February of 1988.

In April 110,200 tourists entered the country, of which 88,200 came by air, 20,600 by land, and 1,400 by sea. There was a 19.5 percent drop in the movement of travelers through Ben Gurion Airport in April as compared to the same month last year.

The figures were supplied by the Central Statistics Bureau and the Ministry of Tourism.

In the first four months of the year, 441,500 tourists arrived in Israel as compared to 447,100 from January to April of last year—a drop of about 1 percent. In the six months from October 1987 to April 1988, 87,300 tourists came on direct flights to Eilat—26 percent more than in the comparable period (October 1986-April 1987) last year.

Rabbis Travel

A delegation of 10 Israeli rabbis will depart this month on a special campaign to the United States to encourage Jewish tourism to Israel.

Delay in Regular Flights to Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia is delaying authorization for the start up of reciprocal El Al flights as per the agreement between the two countries.

The Yugoslav charter company Adria appealed to the Minister of Tourism Haim Qorpo to ask his intervention in contacts between El Al and the national Yugoslav carrier Jat.

Adria fears that if there are no positive results from these contacts, its activity may be affected since it is the only airline company currently running flights between the two countries. The authorization given to that country is contingent on the existence of mutuality in flights.

The general director of the Hungarian airline company, Dari Tomas, completed a visit to Israel last week in which he met with El Al business people and even relaxed in the Hotel Abia Sonesta in Taba. In his meetings with representatives of El Al, he discussed strengthening cooperation between the two airline companies. A new agreement was reached on integrated flights.

An El Al spokesman said yesterday that in talks with the Hungarian representative, there was no discussion of a regular direct line between the two countries. He said that the topic was regular commercial flights, as was the case with representatives of other foreign airline companies.

The Outstanding Tourism Promoter

The winners of the Ministry of Tourism's "Outstanding Tourism Promoters" contest were picked by a public commission. The commission, headed by Re'uven Vitla, named as winners the Sport Hotel, the Club Inn, the Laguna and the King Solomon in Eilat, the King David in Jerusalem and the Hilton in Tel Aviv; the travel agencies Unitours and Paltours; the Ratz Corporation; the Lido restaurant in Tiberias; the Netanya diamond center and the tour guide company Galilee Tours. A commission headed by Avraham Barir will take up appeals of the decisions next week.

Surge in Egypt

(Reuters) 1988 saw a surge in tourism to Egypt: In the first quarter of the year it increased 30 percent according to Minister of Tourism Fu'ad Sultan. Close to 480,000 tourists visited the country during this period.

09794

OMAN

Ministry Signs Agreement To Fund Water Purification Project

44040269 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 29 May 88 p 3

[Article by Shawqi Hafiz]

[Text] Salalah—Musallam Ibn-'Ali al-Busa'idi, the minister of state and governor of Dhofar, yesterday morning signed an agreement on the operation and maintenance

of the Dalkut water desalinization plant. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Oman National Electricity Company by Mirza 'Uthman Bayk, the company chairman. The signing ceremony, held at the minister's office, was attended by Muhammad Ibn-'Awfit al-Shanfari, Dhofar's deputy governor for financial and administrative affairs; Shaykh Muhammad Ibn-Marhun al-Mu'ammari, Dhofar's deputy governor for local affairs; and Engineer 'Azzan Ibn-Ahmad al-Shanfari, the general director of the General Water and Transportation Directorate at the office of the minister of state and governor of Dhofar. Attending the ceremony on behalf of the Company were Mr (Fanshi), the company's technical director, and 'Abd-al-Husayn Ibn-'Abd-al-Khaliq Muhammad, the director of marketing and public relations.

The new plant is one of the biggest projects implemented by the office of the minister of state and governor of Dhofar to supply citizens in all areas with potable water within the framework of the water policy of the government of His Exalted Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id, may God keep him.

Plant Produces 500 Cubic Meters Daily

The Dalkut plant's water desalinization capacity amounts to 500 cubic meters of potable and treated water daily. The plant has been designed to permit increasing this capacity to 750 cubic meters daily with the installation of the additional equipment needed for the purpose.

Project Components

The project consists of two production wells drilled to supply the plant with underground sea water, a desalinization plant which operates according to the inverse effusion method, equipment attached to this plant, electricity generators, a chlorination unit and its attachments and civilian works which include a network to distribute water for the citizens' use, to livestock watering troughs, and to laundry sites used by the citizens. The project also includes a station for filling tanker trucks, an office building, housing for the workers, a guest house, a guard room, and a building housing the electricity generators and the fuel tanks.

Construction Costs

The costs of constructing this vital project have amounted to nearly 1,126,000 Omani riyals, including 40,348 riyals for exploratory wells drilled in the area by the Arab Development Company, 43,760 riyals for two coastal production wells also drilled by the Arab Development Company, 98,817 riyals for the surveying, blueprinting, and supervision work done by a consulting firm and 942,742 riyals for the cost of the construction contract, carried out by a national firm.

Project Operation and Equipment Maintenance

Upon completion of the project, and because of the advanced nature of the desalinization equipment, general bids were invited for the operation and maintenance of the electric generators and the reverse osmosis unit and the work was consequently awarded for a period of three years, beginning in May 1988, to the Omani National Electricity Company. Actual operation and water production started at that time. The total cost of the operation and maintenance contract has amounted to 829,703 riyals.

In Implementation of the Exalted Instructions of His Majesty

The plant has been built within the framework of implementing the exalted instructions of His Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id to provide the requirements of modern life, the most significant of which is potable water, to all of the sultanate's citizens. Within the framework of these instructions, the office of the minister of state and governor of Dhofar launched its efforts to find drinking water sources fit to meet the quantitative and qualitative future needs until the year 2000. The development plan objectives call for supplying the needs according to the priorities given to each area.

Special Attention Paid to Town of Dalkut

At the outset of the blessed awakening, the office of the minister of state and governor of Dhofar devoted attention to supplying the right amount of potable water to the town of Dalkut and the adjacent areas through the use of water tankers and through an amphibian boat which pumped water into the Dalkut town storage tanks. The water was then distributed by tanker trucks.

Fundamental Solution Is Desalinated Sea Water

Because studies are required to supply water regularly and normally throughout the year, the consulting firm of Sir M. MacDonald and Associates was assigned to seek sources other than wells to supply potable water. Now that the project has been completed and put into operation, the area citizens are getting all the potable water they need, thanks to the wise policy of the government of His Exalted Majesty Sultan Sa'id Ibn-Qabus, may God keep him.

New Water Projects Included in Third Five-Year Plan

In an exclusive statement to AL-WATAN, Engineer 'Azzan Ibn-Ahmad al-Shanfari, the general director of the General Water and Transportation Directorate at the office of the minister of state and governor of Dhofar, has said: "We hope to build more significant water projects in the third five-year plan, God willing. These projects are embodied in increasing the number of the production wells in the mountain, upland, and coastal areas. We hope that during the current plan, the number will be increased by 25 new production wells, with

complete civilian and engineering works, so as to achieve greater horizontal expansion in the number of wells in these areas and to serve the largest number possible of their inhabitants. Moreover, it is necessary to provide water to develop the livestock resources which have become one of the significant sources of national income, and which return a big yield to the citizens.

"In the near future, we hope to continue implementing all the needed expansions in the water networks in Salalah and its suburbs and in the area's other towns, so as to serve developmental expansion in the southern province. It is no secret to anybody what benefits this province will reap, God willing, from implementation of the new expansions which will offer the citizen a new living pattern that makes this citizen aware that all his service needs are available."

Six Million Riyals for Water Projects in Current Plan

Engineer 'Azzan Ibn-Ahmad al-Shanfari added: "We thank God for all that He has given us under the leadership of His Exalted Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id, may God keep and protect him. These gifts include the implemented water projects which constitute one of the lofty edifices of the modern Omani awakening. The total cost of the new water projects in the current five-year plan amounts to six million riyals."

Water Projects Nearing Completion

Regarding the water projects nearing completion, Engineer 'Azzan Ibn-Ahmad al-Shanfari said: "The most significant of these projects is the one to supply water to Muqshin, which is a border town. Work on this project is being carried out under the supervision of the Oman Oil Development Company. Most of the work on this project has actually been completed, including two wells drilled in the al-Muntasir area and pipelines extended from the wells site to Muqshin. When the project is completed, the new administrative center in Muqshin, the government housing, and any other buildings will be supplied with potable water. When operating at full capacity, this project will produce 120 cubic meters of water daily."

08494

SUDAN

Al-Turabi Discusses Internal Politics, Foreign Relations

45040169 Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic 4, 5 Jun 88

[Interview with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, Secretary General of the National Islamic Front; date and place of interview not specified; interview conducted and first published by the Lebanese Magazine, AL-SAYYAD]

[4 Jun 88 p 4]

[Text] AL-RAYAH is reprinting this significant and distinguished interview which was conducted with Dr Hasan al-Turabi by the Lebanese Magazine, AL-SAYYAD. Most of the questions in this interview dealt

with international issues. Two questions which dealt with the domestic, political situation were deleted because they were no longer relevant to events. Here is the first installment of this interview.

The National Islamic Front [NIF] in Sudan, which is headed by Dr Hasan al-Turabi, joined the Ummah Party and the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] in signing the National Reconciliation Agreement for the formation of a new coalition government. Deliberations about that new government started after the agreement was signed. It is worth noting that by signing the agreement, the NIF ends the course of political opposition which it had been pursuing: a course that had kept it out of power since the ouster of President Numayri. AL-SAYYAD's interview with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, secretary general of the NIF, took place before Dr al-Turabi signed the agreement, and it dealt with his experience as a major legal figure and a competent strategist. Dr al-Turabi is considered by observers to be a key player in Sudan's political equation within whose guidelines the new government will be formed. Parts of the interview follow.

[Question] Dr Hasan al-Turabi, you are the secretary general of the NIF and an expert in political and legal affairs in Sudan. The third anniversary of the popular uprising in the country is behind us. How would you evaluate the outcome of 3 years in Sudan spent in the pursuit of democracy?

[Answer] Although it was approximately 3 years ago that people rejoiced at the advent of democracy, the course which this democracy took did not realize the hopes which had been placed on it. Actually, it may have even dashed those hopes. First of all, when political parties embarked upon their third round of government in Sudan, they were not ready for it: neither their programs nor their men were ready for government. The first patriots whose struggle had led them to unity and maturity are no longer with us. Many of them had gone into politics because they saw an opportunity there. Political parties lost all their political capital in the old days, but under the new conditions in Sudan, political parties have become totally apathetic to challenges which include the migration of the population, intense and complex international relations, and vehement interventions. The crisis in the south is becoming more intense, and the crisis of earning a living is getting worse.

The Sudanese people keep a close watch on their rulers, but the present government did not remain safe from suspicions of corruption, something which the people of Sudan care about. Thus, freedom became the only manifestation of democracy which was left for the Sudanese people. Very little democratic, popular representation was realized because the political system in Sudan is not based on rules between rulers and the people. It is rather based on tribal solidarity. Furthermore, the government does not appear to be expressing what, according to public opinion, are prevailing aspirations and wishes. Thus, disappointments have been accumulating. The

people of Sudan know the history which always dictates that failing, corrupt coalition governments are doomed to collapse. That is why their fear for democracy grew. This time, however, their fear was not just for democracy, since they would get some consolation for the failure of democracy from the knowledge that they can always restore it with a popular revolution. This time, the people of Sudan fear for the country's very existence, an existence which is now being threatened.

[Question] You said, Dr al-Turabi, that leaders seized an opportunity to get their positions. We think, however, that other leaders inherited theirs. There is a difference between seizing an opportunity to get to a position of leadership and inheriting such a position, isn't there?

[Answer] Yes, there is. Those who inherited their political positions are members of leading families. Historical tribal solidarity, which dictated that they be born to lead, also dictated that the rest of the people were born to follow. This mode of thinking does not hold much promise for political leaders because, first of all, it is not based on any methodical, representative relationship, and it involves no accountability which could give a leader the incentive to do more, to offer more and to observe discipline. No matter who he is and what he does, a leader is a leader. But those who seized an opportunity to get to their political positions are a group of intellectuals who used to stay away from public affairs. Then they found that there was no one in traditional political parties which intellectuals stayed away from. They determined that breaking into those parties would be an easy way to get to power without paying the cost of making commitments to the people.

[Question] The war in south Sudan has been going on for a long period of time. Now there are dangerous disturbances in both west and east Sudan. What are the reasons which led these sectarian and tribal disputes to get worse, and how can this imminent danger be warded off?

[Answer] First of all, we in Sudan have the misfortune of being in a complex country whose inhabitants represent almost all the people of Africa whose languages, physical characteristics, ethnic groups and conventions are also represented. It is a large country where the means of communication are deplorable. The close ties which the people of Sudan have had, managed to hold them together, and they became known for their tolerant spirit. But growing political, security, and economic tensions eroded much of this tolerance and fraternity. Successive political systems undermined the respect for authority which can hold Sudan together and envelop it. Furthermore, political parties and religious sects which used to tie the Sudanese people together faded and died out. They faded without the intellectuals and without the residents in the provinces who were hit hard by famine and poverty but received no help from their religious or political leaders. That is why they lost confidence in those leaders. Thus, after a long time under Numayri,

who had eliminated parties and dealt a blow to them in favor of having one party, what we have now is actually not even one party, which was a party in form only anyway. What we ended up with is a situation in which the people of Sudan have reverted to their local and tribal ties. Tribal chauvinism has actually been ignited in a hitherto unprecedented manner.

We have also had another misfortune. We are surrounded by countries which abound with economic problems and political strife, and that causes people in those countries to seek refuge with us. Our domestic life has thus been complicated by the addition of those expatriates who also brought with them large amounts of weapons which turned tensions into armed conflicts. For us, this is a new phenomenon.

[Question] This phenomenon does constitute a threat, doesn't it?

[Answer] Yes, it does. It threatens an area that is much larger than Lebanon. No matter what is said about the prejudices and narrow-mindedness of Lebanon's sectarian leaders, they do have a minimal amount of awareness. Our leaders, however, may be tribal leaders who may be ignorant, undisciplined and unscrupulous.

[Question] And herein lies the danger. Dr al-Turabi, there were some controls in Lebanon, weren't there?

[Answer] People in Lebanon were sometimes dissuaded from going too far in their violent practices because they thought about their interests. In Sudan, however, people do not care about what happens to them because they have nothing to lose. No one protects economic interests; no one protects the sense of national affiliation; and there is no effective body in power to use its regulatory forces to provide protection.

[Question] Do you believe there is a state of chaos now in Sudan?

[Answer] We are about to have total chaos. If we had to choose, we would choose a military regime which can protect the country itself but do away with freedom. That would be better than a regime which could cost us everything: our freedom and our country.

[Question] Your front is being accused of obstructing a solution to the crisis in the south because you refuse to negotiate with John Garang, and you insist that the canonical laws of Islam, including prescribed legal punishments, be applied in all of Sudan. What do you think about that?

[Answer] What is said about the Garang issue abroad is different from the facts in Sudan. Among other things, the Garang issue is being attributed to the question of the canonical laws of Islam even though the Garang issue emerged on the scene 30 years before Islamic law was declared. Its recent outbreak, however, came a few

months before Islamic law was declared. And yet, the canonical law of Islam has never been applied in the south. Although the facts indicate otherwise, one of the statements which is being made about the Garang issue is that those who represent the canonical laws of Islam in Sudan are the ones who are interfering the most in the question of the south.

My dear man, our movement is a national one. We tried to overcome the shortcomings which were attributed to political parties in some provinces as well as those which befell some people. The front was established on an advisory basis, and its members were to include people from the south and the north. Our front has among its members and its leaders people from the south. That is why our concern for the south did not manifest itself in conducting a dialogue with the other party. We were deliberating the matter within the front. We were the first people to talk with John Garang, and we talked with him in London, in Kenya, and in Ethiopia.

[Question] Did you talk with him in Ethiopia too?

[Answer] Yes, we did. We were the first people to talk with the southern forces about the issues which are in dispute in Sudan. At the same time others have been dealing with Garang and talking about the present division of power. We were the first people to come out with a constitutional document which outlined matters with precision and in detail and dealt with them unequivocally on the basis of these talks which we conducted. We think it was one of the most generous proposals made regarding the division of power and the division of wealth as well. We proposed a federation for the south and even for all of Sudan's regions. We presented several measures which would guarantee that backward areas would catch up with advanced ones. We presented ideas and principles regarding the question of subcultures which abound in Sudan. We talked about how these subcultures could coexist freely, communicate with each other in earnest, and move toward a more comprehensive culture. We presented the question of religion and that of the freedom of worship. We also talked about the question of the canonical law of Islam and how it would be applied in a decentralized manner. Some aspects of the law, which deal with personal affairs and family law would not be applied to everyone across the board. A family's religion would determine the application of those laws. Some prescribed legal punishments would be applied in principle all over Sudan. However, each province which has a non-Muslim majority can exempt itself from said application and choose other punishments.

We have not heard of another document which is so detailed and so liberal in its decentralization of the law. In addition, it calls for equal opportunity in public life; it does away with all tribal prejudices and their manifestations; and it sets the right course for domestic and foreign policies in a manner that speaks for all the identities and affiliations of the Sudanese people.

The fact that we too are calling for moral and material support for the armed forces inside Sudan indicates that we do, of course, want the armed forces to perform their duty. We want the armed forces to protect the country's territory and honor and ensure the safety of its innocent citizens. We also want to persuade John Garang that he cannot win over any part of Sudan with swords and guns alone.

Garang tells himself sometimes that it is an ongoing revolution that can exhaust and weaken the enemy. With such a revolution, he tells himself, he can change the regime in Sudan, lay claim to the entire country, and try a Marxist, socialist regime.

We want to persuade Garang to negotiate. We want political leaders to make an earnest effort for security and defense. We want them to make an earnest effort for peace and negotiations because we think the two go together. Strength and peace go hand in hand, and the approach must involve a stick and a carrot. Without such a balance we do not think the issue of the south now involves intense international interventions, and no longer involves the Sudanese people, their talks and disputes.

[Question] Are Ethiopia and Uganda involved?

[Answer] Yes, Ethiopia is involved. Western and eastern international schemes are also involved. It is now difficult to extricate this issue from these international relations and make it the subject of a dialogue for the people of Sudan who managed more than once to settle that issue in particular.

[Question] What was Garang's reaction to those documents when you presented them to him?

[Answer] I regret to say that it has become clear to us that Garang is not ready for negotiations. He may not have done much to talk himself into these negotiations.

Many of his detailed positions are still unknown. We, of course, have been striving for the talks. We talked with the World Council of Churches about this agreement, and we presented it at broad, Arab, African and diplomatic councils. There is hardly any other proposal on the table. Some of our fellow Sudanese citizens from the south would tell you in confidence that this formula would be acceptable to those who are armed as well as those who are not. But they are being distracted by today's pressing and imminent issues of dividing power in Sudan. It is regrettable to say that from a partisan standpoint, our fellow Sudanese citizens in the south are very much divided. That is why none of them dares to take a courageous position on these perpetual issues. Instead, they leave them unresolved.

[Question] Do you believe, Dr al-Turabi, that it will be possible for Garang to change his mind after the recent events and agree to negotiations?

[Answer] To persuade John Garang to negotiate, the other international implications of the matter have to be dealt with through diplomatic channels with Ethiopia and its backers. The military situation in Sudan must also be somewhat shored up so that John Garang would give up on the idea that pursuing this course could lead him to achieve his objectives. Today there are no signs indicating that John Garang has moved any closer to negotiations. We invited him to talk several times provided he come to the negotiating table anywhere without any preconditions. We might then find some way to reach a national reconciliation. Today, however, there are no signs of that even though relations with Ethiopia are becoming somewhat flexible and it is rumored that Garang's movement is becoming weak internally. That may curb Garang's pride, but even though the situation here in Sudan has become somewhat stronger, John Garang remains unconvinced that he should talk with the present powers in Sudan.

[Question] Egyptian officials told me that there was a crisis of confidence between Sudan and Ethiopia. They said that removing this lack of confidence would achieve a national solution for Eritrea, a solution that would keep Eritrea part of Ethiopia. It would also achieve a national solution for south Sudan, and that would keep the south part of a united Sudan. What do you think about that proposal?

[Answer] On both popular and political grounds relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have been good for a long period of time. Relations became somewhat tense after the revolution in Ethiopia and after the question of Eritrea was stepped up. They became even more tense after Ethiopia's blatant adoption of south Sudan. Ethiopia gave Garang radio broadcasting facilities and weapons, and it provided him with military support to invade the borders of Sudan, a country that has borders with nine countries and must, therefore, endure the consequences of that situation. Although this is not what Sudan wants, the country's borders are open to approximately 1 million Eritrean citizens. Sudan trains those people, but it does not give them weapons because it does not have any. It only gives them the freedom to travel because they are refugees. And yet, Ethiopia is blaming us for tolerating the refugees. It may be that because of its youth, the Ethiopian Revolution is not quite ready mentally to admit that the Ethiopian Empire used to include several ethnic groups which are now looking for their identity through independence or local autonomy. And revolutions have always liked to exercise centralized control in their early years. If the Ethiopian Revolution were to accept that situation and if it were to adopt a liberal approach in forging its national, constitutional relations to allow for a greater measure of freedom, it might pursue another course which would bring it closer to peaceful coexistence.

In Sudan, we do not compare the question of Eritrea with that of the south. The question of Eritrea is basically an international one, but that of the south is basically

domestic. We recognize these differences, and we respect them from a cultural and a religious standpoint. Power is being broadly distributed here by region. Over there, however, no such tolerance is shown. Furthermore, our opposition to Ethiopia has not undergone any change, despite Ethiopian provocations, and we have not matched all the support it provides. We hope that this new round of relations will have a positive outcome. If the people of Sudan give up, they will put more energy into supporting the people of Eritrea whose revolution is a greater threat to Ethiopia's security than what is happening in the south. However, it is not our wish to spread corruption and unrest in the region because we are neighbors, [and we know that] if we start a fire in our neighbor's house, that fire could spread to our house.

[5 June 88 p 5]

[Text] [Question] And now, what can you tell us about domestic, political equations and alliances in Sudan?

[Answer] The Ummah Party and its leaders came to power this time with what almost amounted to overconfidence. They had a broad mandate from the people and from the international community as well. The call for democracy which accompanied their advent to power sometimes gave them a sense of false optimism. These events and incidents have now lowered everyone's morale and confidence. Because the president of the Ummah Party is a perceptive man, he realized the minute he saw the election results that traditional equations for governing Sudan had to be changed because the intellectual class which actually rules the country and has always restored democracy had taken sides with another side. Competing in the elections did not help change that equation. When the president of the Ummah Party tried again, the party, with which he had allied himself, feared the entry of a third power in government might expedite the the third power's succession to traditional regimes. That party, therefore, preferred to stay outside government. But the opposition outside government continued to grow also because of the government's failures and the opposition's active prodding. As awareness grew and as the modern sector made progress, the opposition grew because it was a social and cultural force for spontaneous progress.

This time the two parties, the Ummah Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, came to us with considerable humility. The formulas they had used to form a coalition had floundered because of a strong sense of frustration and failure. They were unable to govern Sudan. So we had to embark on this experiment. It was hoped we might be able to save Sudan before yielding to the other alternative.

[Question] All right. Can dissolving the Constituent Assembly and holding new parliamentary elections provide a solution?

[Answer] [Not] even if we overlooked the text of the constitution and amended it! The constitution stipulates that the assembly may not be dissolved until its term is completed and the constitution drafted after 2 more years. But even if we were to overlook this legal obstacle, dissolving the assembly today could result in having elections held in north Sudan only. In fact, in some areas of north Sudan holding elections may be impossible for security reasons. This means that the country's fragmentation from a constitutional standpoint will be reinforced, and that would be a very serious matter.

Any way, how useful will such elections be to the two traditional parties? They will essentially lose some of their supporters. The NIF will essentially make some inroads into their territory, and we will find ourselves in a situation which, for these two parties, could be worse than the present one.

[Question] It may be worse for them, but we are talking about the future of Sudan as a whole. I know that active international leaders think that Dr Hasan al-Turabi can save the day. I am talking about Hasan al-Turabi himself and not the NIF. Hasan al-Turabi can function as a guarantor. He can be a safety valve for this country which is now being torn apart. Active international forces do not want this country to be torn apart.

[Answer] In the course of a country's development discrepancies always occur between the electorate of a certain group and its political power, and between government's competence and its appearance of legitimacy. This is what is happening in Sudan, and it is changing quickly. But we have to be patient until the time is right.

[Question] But I think that the right time for this idea is actually approaching, and I think it is approaching fast. Let me repeat: I am not talking about the front, but I am talking about Hasan al-Turabi.

[Answer] Yes, yes, but we must take into account the formula for the composition of parliament. I am not a member of parliament, and our bloc in parliament is the third bloc.

[Question] Is it small?

[Answer] Yes it is; and yet, it has political clout. Our bloc is effective; it is wise; and it counts the intellectual class among its members. These superficial considerations will resist any other considerations for a period of time.

[Question] It is expected that the Fraternity Agreement between Egypt and Sudan will be signed during the Egyptian prime minister's visit to Khartoum. (Dr 'Atif Sidqi did in fact visit Khartoum, and the Sudanese negotiating delegation which was headed by Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi consisted of two NIF members.) What do you think about this agreement?

[Answer] The fault we find with the agreement is its assumption that the relationship between Sudan and Egypt is a superficial one. The fact that Sudan has had different successive governments in power is the reason why these governments are always looking for a new formula for that relationship. They want to take credit for a new formula even if that means the destruction of past accomplishments and experiences.

Actually, building on old accomplishments would have been possible, and we could have made preparations for making gradual progress. But Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi preferred to have all traces of the old relationship removed, and he wanted to start as though Egypt and Sudan were getting together for the first time in their histories. So we started with this fraternity. But the fact of the matter is that ties between Egypt and Sudan are greater than all governments and regimes. The common values, which the two countries share among other things, are more everlasting than all disputes and agreements, no matter what. Our fellow Egyptians were forgiving. They said, "Let's assume that Egypt and Sudan did not know about each other until now." And yet, the agreement was kept behind the scenes, and no progress was made on it. Although those who were involved in this matter in the government of Sudan have always been concerned about relations between their country and Egypt, it is regrettable that they were not effective in power. In pursuing relations between Egypt and Sudan, they did not follow any strategy. They thought that relations between the two countries were relations between individuals, and they were satisfied with that.

We, of course, have gone beyond the historical antipathy which existed for those who have been in power in Egypt for a long time. Our relations with Egypt, which are now closer, were set forth as a strategic response to radical needs. We tried to promote relations between the people of the two countries, a subject which does indeed concern us. The motivation now for closer ties between Egypt and Sudan is getting stronger in both countries. For example, Sudan suffered quite a shock at the time of the Kurmuk crisis. Arab countries called upon each other to help Sudan, but the people of Sudan sensed the absence of Egypt. And although Egypt was making allowances for its relations with Ethiopia, strong pressure from public opinion in Sudan made it necessary for Egypt to help Sudan in some way.

[Question] Egypt is offering Sudan military assistance, is it not?

[Answer] The motivation here and there is effective. Both governments have to force relations between the two countries to take on a shape that is radical and concrete.

[Question] And strategic?

[Answer] Yes, it is our view that the ideal situation for these relations would be to bring the two peoples closer together through the means of transportation and communication. Each country is to treat people from both countries equally so that both peoples can play the major role, which it is hoped they will play, to effect these relations. Such a foundation would be more everlasting than regimes and political systems which frequently succeed each other, especially in Sudan. It is feared that something new might happen in Sudan and that we would, consequently, start [all over again] with an agreement that would have another name besides the Integration and Fraternity Agreement.

[Question] The rock throwing revolution in the occupied land created new equations which might have forced the U.S. administration to take action in the Middle East. Do you agree with some Arab leaders, including King Husayn and President Mubarak, that it is necessary to deal with the U.S. proposals? Those Arab leaders think that we should not turn down these proposals and that we should instead try to amend them and change them in a way that would serve the cause.

[Answer] The rock throwing revolution may not be the ideal occasion for diplomatic action to negotiate the matter. This is because revolution indicates that people have given up on diplomatic negotiations. I appreciate the existing constraints which impel the Arab nations to look for equations for peace, and I am confident that the ultimate intentions of a majority of the Arab leaders are good. I also appreciate the PLO, which was compelled by necessity to become involved in that regard also. But, of course, these essential negotiations gradually took us away from the principles of the cause and its fundamental justice. The rock throwing revolution is some kind of rebellion against the root cause of the question and the conditions into which negotiations have led us. It serves as some kind of reminder of the principles underlying these people's legal claim to their cause.

Despair also led those people to seek ways of expressing themselves which were not marked by nationalism and negotiations. They wanted to express themselves in ways that were marked by the Islamic revival, which in most of the Arab and Islamic world, is associated with the kind of despair people feel about other models [which are used to solve problems].

[Question] That is because Islam is our last recourse or our last resort, is it not?

[Answer] Yes, it is one way of expressing failure, but this may not be an ideal analogy. I think the rock throwing revolution will create a new equation on the scene which will force Israel and the western world to entertain new ideas for dealing with the question. It might be best if the Arab world were to apply more pressure on those who are in charge in Israel. It is astonishing that it never occurs to us to intensify the pressure on the United States, which is now Israel's ultimate protector, because

we wallow in our despair and have given in to our impotence. Palestinians are expelled from a legitimate diplomatic post, and we do not hear that anyone thought about doing something with the U.S. institutions in our countries. We have heard of no measure, other than a verbal response, which was taken to let the United States know that the Arabs have responded to the challenge. I do not like to second-guess people who are in positions of responsibility. They carry the burden of these responsibilities, or they endure the consequences of sensitive political decisions which are made under these circumstances, but I would have liked to see the revolution of our fellow Palestinians give us a shock too. I would have liked the Palestinian Revolution to remind us, at a time when we are being subjected to many misfortunes, that we have gone too far in our divisiveness. I would have liked the revolution to have given us another shock to restore us somehow to a period characterized by a sense of unity as well as challenge. This is because all relations in the world today are based on strength, not on friendliness and appeasement. Even if relations were based on friendship, that friendship has to be counterbalanced with strength to protect the relationship from turning into one of degradation and capitulation.

[Question] You were in Cairo, Dr al-Turabi, when U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz visited that city twice. Egyptian officials assured me that this time the United States was serious about the proposals it was making. They said we should not reject the proposals, and even though we may not like them, we had to try to have them changed and altered. This means we should not fool around and waste time. What do you think about that?

[Answer] Nothing useful, of course, has ever come out of a negative, rejection policy. It would be good for the Arabs to adopt an intelligent approach to this American initiative, which comes during the final days of President Reagan's term in office. It is very rare that initiatives are made at such a time, unless this initiative was made as some kind of response to pressure from the American people. We should harness this pressure and encourage it so that it can develop further; it might even have a greater impact on the new administration in a new stage.

[Question] But it is hoped, Dr al-Turabi, that the next U.S. administration under George Bush will be an extension of the Reagan administration. It seems that George Schultz might continue to preside over U.S. diplomacy in the new administration. That is why many people think that the American actions which are being taken in the region are likely to continue under the new administration. What is also noteworthy is that the western media, and the American media in particular, were the ones who reported to us the harshness of Israeli repression in response to the uprising. At the same time our media were in deep slumber. How do you account for that?

[Answer] The western media have a monopoly over the international scene. This is one manifestation of western domination which we see in the economy, in politics and

in military affairs. To a certain degree our media does nothing more than reflect theirs. All major events in the Islamic and Arab worlds are relayed to us by western newspapers which give us information about these events. I have been complaining about the fact that most of the events which take place in Sudan are distorted before they are carried by the western press. And that is why I am delighted to meet with you because I know you will not distort the facts.

08592

SYRIA

Iddah Favors Popular Empowerment of Presidential Candidate

44040272A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 31 May 88 p 3

[Text] Brigadier General Raymon Iddah maintains that any candidate in Lebanon's presidential elections must derive his power from the people, and not from directives originating abroad. He stated: "These are my conditions for approving the presidency of the republic, and I will not haggle over them."

In remarks published by the Jordanian newspaper, AL-RA'Y, Iddah stated that his basic condition for approving the presidency is the withdrawal of the Israeli Army in order to preclude the possibility of Israeli intervention to undermine the elections. He is of the opinion that the Syrian presence in Lebanon is based on an official request, and "that my duty is to liberate my country from the Israeli occupation, and that Washington is capable, if it desires, of forcing Israel to withdraw." He believes Washington, Paris, Moscow, and the Vatican have a role in the region, and that there is no Syrian-American agreement yet on who will be the next president.

13286

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Summer Military Training Described

44040263B Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 27 May 88 p 4

[Article by Sulayman al-Mahi]

[Text] Ra's al-Khaymah—Brigadier General Sultan Ibn-Saqr al-Qasimi, the deputy governor of Ra's al-Khaymah, and commander of the Second Badr Brigade,

praised the efforts expended by His Highness Zayid Ibn-Sultan Al Nuhayyan, the president of the state and supreme commander of the armed forces, to support the armed forces with personnel from among the sons of the nation.

In a statement to AL-BAYAN, His Highness stated that the summer training program for school students is one of those beneficent, virtuous efforts which His Highness, the supreme commander of the armed forces, desires to implement at its appointed time in order to achieve the exalted goal of providing the youth of the nation, who are still in school, with military training methods in order to give them the incentive to join the armed forces in the future, or to enable them to respond to the call of the nation if necessary, even if they are not in armed forces.

Brigadier General Sultan added that the sons of the Emirates will be held in high repute by their father, His Highness, the president of the state and supreme commander of the armed forces, when they go to the registration centers today to sign up for the summer military training program.

It should be mentioned that summer military training for students will begin on Saturday, 11 June, and end on Wednesday, 20 July 1988.

Registration of students desiring military training starts today and runs through 2 June 1988. Registration will be limited to students and those who have not previously participated in summer training courses. Participants must be at least 14 years old.

Students in the Abu Dhabi area who wish to participate can register at the recruitment office at Camp Al Nuhayyan, students in al-'Ayn can register at the al-'Ayn recruitment office, and students in the northern emirates can register at the al-'Aghrar training center at Manamah.

The armed forces will provide trainees with housing, clothing, transportation, and medical treatment at military hospitals. Each student will receive a monthly, average stipend of 1,200 dirhams, and a weekly 24-hour leave period, which begins after regular class hours on Thursday.

13286

INDIA

Agreement on Purchase of Iraqi Crude Signed
46001544 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
31 May 88 p 7

[Text] Baghdad, May 30 (UNI)—India will import 2.5 million tonnes of crude oil from Iraq during the current financial year.

An agreement to this effect was reached at a high-level meeting of officials of the two countries here last week. Iraq is a major oil supplier to India.

A major portion of 140 million dollar of the deal will be adjusted against outstanding dues, which the war-affected nations owe to major Indian private and public sector companies. These companies had executed major construction, water treatment, railways and other projects in Iraq in the last eight years.

The remaining amount will be paid by the Indian Government in cash to Iraq. The Iraqi Government has requested India to defer the outstanding payment for another two years.

Iraq informed the Indian delegation, which comprised officials of the commerce, finance and other ministries, that the country was not in a position to pay the entire dues on account of the ongoing Gulf war.

Iraq has refused to pay heavy dues to France and Yugoslavia.

Despite the war, more than 40 Indian companies are still operating in Iraq. Most of them have completed their projects. These companies feel that Iraq continues to be a good place for investment.

The Indian companies have shifted their priorities from construction to management and maintenance sectors.

The Indian public sector company Rail India Technical and Engineering Services has bagged a prestigious project for the maintenance of railway operations in Iraq. The Rs 282 crore five-year project started in April 1988.

/9274

IRAN

Construction of 20 New Towns Planned
46000171b Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English
30 May 88 p 6

[Text] Tehran, 29 May (KAYHAN INT'L)—Minister of Housing Serajeddin Kazerouni said in Orumieh, capital of West Azarbaijan Province during weekend that in

accordance with the new articles of association for metropolitan land, 20 towns and 220 large residential complexes would be built throughout Iran.

Addressing a press conference he said that by implementing the new articles of association, the housing priority has been given to the needy.

He said that since the West Azarbaijan Province was rich in construction materials such as cement and sand, a prefabricated house factory would be completed and put into operation by 1989 in the province.

/12232

New Tehran-Mashhad Highway To Shorten Distance
46000171a Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English
21 May 88 p 15

[Text] Tehran, 20 May (KAYHAN INT'L)—Director general of Semnan's Road and Transportation Department told the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) on the weekend that the construction of Tehran-Mashhad's new highway would be finished by the end of current Iranian year (20 March 1989).

He said, "The new highway shortens the distance between Tehran and Mashhad by a number of hours, while it reduces the traffic of the old route to Mashhad, which passes through northeastern towns of Iran."

/12232

PAKISTAN

Junejo's Actions Blamed for Government's Failure
46560045a Karachi AMN in Urdu
31 May 88 p 3

[Column "From Jumma Khan's Pen": "Fate of Those Who Crowned the Dictator"]

[Excerpts] People who believe in democracy are not surprised at what happened to Junejo's government and the way it was treated by a president who was never elected to his position. This government was elected on a non-party basis and the people won elections on their own rather than through the support of a political party. They did not have any plan or program for solving the country's problems. These people belonged to different schools of thought and had been affiliated with various political parties. When the Muslim League party was established after the elections, these power-hungry people joined it to get their share of the loot. They never tried to make the Muslim League a political party even though they were in position to do so for 3 years. They did not even try to hold public meetings in a provincial capital to establish rapport with the people. This party was only a party on paper. Not a single Muslim League leader raised a voice in protest when this party fell from

grace. Former cabinet members who belonged to this party did not even challenge the president about the accusations levied against it.

Only a strong political party could have objected if it was removed from power the way Mohammad Khan Junejo's party was thrown out of office. If this had happened to a strong party, the people would have come out into the streets. The members of this government were elected without the support of any political party. They had sold their conscience for five million rupees and had crowned the chief of armed forces as a president until 1990. The people do not have any sympathy or desire to help these leaders, regardless how they may treat them now.

Mr Junejo and his associates repeatedly announced that they participated in non-party elections to help the nation get rid of the martial law regime. If there was even an ounce of truth in their claim, were really sincere about establishing a democratic government, and were concerned about the country, they would have resigned from the cabinet any time after martial law was lifted to pave way for elections with full participation by political parties. They were just hungry for power. They did not resign even when there were incidents of sabotage and communal riots worse than the Hindu-Muslim fighting of 1947. They even discouraged demands for mid-term elections. They did not take advantage of the opportunity when the validity of the election of the prime minister, chief ministers, and cabinet members was questioned because they had joined the Muslim League which was not even registered as a political party.

Instead they fired the speaker of the House who supported democracy and made changes in the law to keep themselves in the government. This was an extreme case of sacrificing democracy for personal gain.

We cannot blame the failure of Mohammad Khan Junejo's government and the substandard performance of the National Assembly of his associates. All this resulted from the structure that General Zia had established during his martial law regime and which was later forced on the politicians elected through non-party elections. The government of these civilian rulers was nothing more than a rubber stamp government. They were so helpless that they approved a uniformed general to remain president until 1990. They gave the military general the right to abolish the National Assembly and fire the prime minister at his whim. They lost the right to evaluate the military president. They passed a law recognizing the martial law government's activities as valid and requiring all political prisoners to serve the sentences meted out by military courts. Thus, a PPP member who had just burned a bus cannot get out of jail for 25 years.

If these Muslim League politicians had added a clause to the amendment to the constitution requiring approval by the prime minister for the president to abolish the National Assembly, General Zia would not have been able to axe the National Assembly the way he did on that Sunday evening. However, no one worked diligently or thought about the nation or democracy when making changes in the constitution.

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